

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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The Attitude of the Soviet People Toward the West, <i>Oleg Anisimov</i>	79
Emigré Anti-Soviet Enterprises and Splits, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i>	91
"Peace" in Soviet Strategy, <i>Phyllis A. Greenlaw</i>	99
Translation of A. S. Pushkin's "The History of the Village of Goriukhino," <i>Thomas G. Winner</i>	120
Americans in the Crimean War, <i>Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov</i>	137
Ivan Bunin, <i>Jacques Croisé</i>	146

BOOK REVIEWS

A Century of Conflict; Communist Techniques of World Revolution, <i>by Stefan Possony, W. W. Kulski</i>	152
Beyond Containment, <i>by W. H. Chamberlin, Anatole Shub</i>	154
Russia, What Next?, <i>by Isaac Deutscher, Kenneth I. Dailey</i> ...	155

Continued on Page II

Tolstoy: A Life of My Father, <i>by</i> Alexandra Tolstoy, <i>Helene Iswolsky</i>	156
City Planning in Soviet Russia, <i>by</i> Maurice F. Parkins, <i>Nicolai S. Vorobiov</i>	157
A History of Russia, <i>by</i> Sir Bernard Pares, <i>Warren B. Walsh</i> ..	159
Book Notices	161

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Attitude of the Soviet People Toward the West

BY OLEG ANISIMOV

THE political outlook of nations, like that of individuals, is basically the product of experience. This experience is not confined to momentous events like wars and revolutions, but includes all those facts of everyday life which have relevance to the activities of the government and its agencies. This latter sort of experience, subtler and less conspicuous than the former, plays a preponderant rôle in creating the political backdrop against which the ordinary citizen sees all events and developments. This backdrop is made up of notions that are taken for granted. The average citizen is unaware of their existence and of the way in which they determine his consciously held opinions. This makes them all the more important.

In the case of the Soviet citizen, the most characteristic component of his political background is the conviction that in all countries "government" and "people" are far from being identical. The fact that in certain countries governments are elected by free ballot, whereas in others they are not, has little, if any, bearing on this notion. He knows from experience that allegedly free elections do not give him a choice in the selection of his government. What proof does he have that free elections in other countries are actually free and result in the formation of a truly representative government? He projects his own political experience into his judgment of other nations and their governments; just as millions of people in the Western countries, on the basis of their experience, construed the granting of the 1936 Constitution, providing for elections in the Soviet Union, as proof that Russia was becoming a democracy.

The average Soviet citizen, therefore draws a distinction also between the people of the United States and their government. Most Soviet people tend to be favorably inclined towards the American people, but distrust the United States government. A very typical case in point was the attitude displayed by a recent defector from the Soviet occupation force in Eastern Germany. The defector, a private, reported that most Soviet soldiers scoffed at Communist propaganda and contended that the "hate-America"

campaign had been a complete failure. Continuing his account of conditions in the Soviet zone of occupation, he came to talk about the Soviet WACs, and said that these "ugly and stupid" girls were very unpopular with the soldiers, who called them derisively the "Marshall Plan." He went on to explain that the Soviet government had no use for these girls back home and sent them to Germany to get rid of them, in much the same manner that the American government dumped all sorts of useless trash in Europe under the guise of the "Marshall Plan." And yet the man thought that the United States was a fine country and wanted to emigrate there. But like most of his fellow-soldiers he took it for granted that all governments, including that of the United States, are dishonest in their political dealings.

I am not suggesting here that the Soviet citizen considers the United States government to be similar to that of his own country. Far from it. Most Soviet people with whom I have had opportunity to talk about the United States thought that life was freer, pleasanter, more prosperous, in general "better" in the U.S.A. than in Russia. Most of them held the view that the American government interferes less in the private pursuits of its citizens than does the Soviet government, and that it is more efficient and less oppressive. But this was not associated in the mind of my interlocutors with free elections and the representative form of government.

Another illustration of the same political notion was furnished in a different manner by a Soviet major who deserted from the Soviet occupation zone after the anti-Communist riots in Eastern Germany in June, 1953. He spoke at some length of the ineffectiveness of Communist propaganda and of his liking for the American people. But when discussing the anti-Communist riots in Germany, he pointed out that the fear of attack and invasion of Russia by the Americans was one of the reasons why many Soviet anti-Communists (including himself) had refrained from joining in the revolt. According to him, this fear also inhibits the possibility of an uprising in Russia. The major considered himself immune to Communist propaganda. And yet he assumed that the United States government would seize upon any internal disorders as an opportunity to attack and to subjugate Russia. Did not the Western Powers intervene during the Civil War in Russia? Would his own rulers miss an opportunity to conquer a country weakened by internal strife? Why should the American government be different?

On the basis of his own experience, the average Soviet citizen

also distrusts official American sources of information. When the Korean war broke out, I was approached in Hamburg by two Soviet defectors who asked me to tell them "the real truth" about who was the aggressor. They explained to me that being "just ordinary people" they could not get at the "real truth," because "our [the Soviet] propaganda says one thing, and their [the American] propaganda says the exact opposite." They did not believe either side. Soviet defectors in Western Germany often sought my opinion as to the veracity of the reports of the United States information services.

So far we have dealt with the distrust with which a great many Soviet citizens tend to view the United States government and, more generally, all governments. On the other hand, it is often the case that Soviet people, instead of assuming that the governments of Western countries are as dishonest as their own, try to escape the frustrating experience of Soviet realities by attributing to non-Communist governments all the ideal qualities of a wish-dream government. I have come across many cases illustrating this tendency to idealize the West. One of the most striking was the account given by a defector of the "unimaginable shock" which he experienced on realizing that the Americans would do nothing about the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, though it was a violation of an agreement to which the United States government was a party. I have often met Soviet people who thought so highly of American political life that they were unable, rather, unwilling to recognize that governments run by mortals cannot be perfect. Most defectors belong in this category of idealizers of the West. As a rule, after their escape they are profoundly disillusioned by the realities of the political life in the Western World.

If we compare the attitude of the average Soviet citizen around 1940 with what it is now, there are many indications that the tendency towards idealization is decreasing and the tendency to distrust is increasing. The experience with Nazi Germany, which was regarded by Soviet people as a western country much like any other, were, to say the least, disillusioning. Nor were the zigzags of United States foreign policy of a nature to instill confidence in the West. The Soviet people cannot ascertain the "real truth" about the reasons which caused Washington to change its policy from the use of force in delivering Soviet citizens in Western Europe to the Kremlin in 1945-46 to the use of force against the Communists in Korea in 1950.

Developments in the United Nations also tend to lower the prestige of the West, and in particular of the United States, in the eyes of the Soviet people. An anti-Communist defector said to me that back home he had discounted every word of Communist propaganda, but revised his opinion later because "if the Soviet representatives in the United Nations were telling baseless lies, they would be ejected from that institution within twenty-four hours." The charges and counter-charges bandied about in the United Nations between the American and Soviet delegates have done little good to American prestige in Russia. Soviet people cannot check the substance of these accusations, but the sharp speeches made by United States delegates have familiar accents and enable the Soviet citizen to regard them in accordance with his customary political notions. They are not different in kind from the speeches of his own delegates. By a conscious or subconscious process, he comes to the conclusion that Moscow and Washington move on the same political plane. It is only natural that continuing the analogy, he assumes that the American government pursues the same ultimate goal as does the Soviet government: world power.

From his early childhood the Soviet citizen is taught that wars are first and foremost showdowns between opposing political systems. This tenet of the Marxist dogma was corroborated for him by two world wars. Both the First and the Second World Wars were accompanied by great, indeed revolutionary, changes. They changed the whole political map of the European continent. In Russia, the First World War led to the collapse of the Tsarist régime and the establishment of the Bolshevik system. The Second World War resulted in even more momentous political changes. It divided the entire world into two opposed camps. Around seventy million Soviet people experienced, at some time or other during this war, foreign domination, which was accompanied by the institution in the occupied territories of an entirely new political régime. No matter how much Nazism had in common with Communism, it meant a revolution for the population in the sense that the Nazis were "anti-Communist," and occupation entailed penalization of those who had enjoyed authority under the Soviet régime. Opponents of Communism, on the other hand, were looked upon with favor and appointed to positions in local administrations. Furthermore, Soviet people know that Communist régimes are instituted in all countries occupied by the Soviet Army. The association between war and political change comes so naturally to most Soviet people that during

the last war there was in the Soviet Union a widespread feeling that after the end of hostilities Stalin "by way of reward" would parcel out the collective farms among the farmers and in general would grant the people more freedom.

War and politics are as inseparable in the eyes of Soviet people as are politics and power. Not that they believe that might makes right. But they are much more acutely aware than are most people of the Western World that right without power is a fiction. They tend to view "living history" as a combination of politics and force. Most of them see nothing reprehensible in the fact—rather the contrary. Those Soviet people who still remember the democratic March Revolution in Russia, denounce the "weaklings" who were brought into power by this revolution, but proved unable to hold their own against the Bolsheviks. What the majority of my Soviet interlocutors held against the Bolsheviks, Stalin, or Hitler was not their having used force in order to impose their politics, but their having used it to enforce "bad" or "wrong" policies. Though Lenin, too, had used force, his name is more often than not mentioned with praise on account of his having used his power in order to introduce in Russia the liberal economic policy known as the N.E.P., which is remembered as a period of economic prosperity and relative freedom.

The possibility of World War III is therefore associated in the mind of the Soviet man not only with the prospect of hardship and devastation, but also with the possibility of big political and economic changes. Whether these changes would be for the better or for the worse is to the bulk of the population an open question. I believe that at present none but forced labor camp internees and possibly a segment of the peasantry regard war as an acceptable price for liberation from Bolshevism. But whether they wish for it or not, most Soviet people regard World War III as hardly avoidable, and speculation about its ultimate political and economic impact on their country play an important part in determining their attitude toward both the Soviet government and the United States. They realize that the United States is the only power in the world potentially capable of defeating the Soviet Union and thereby exercising a decisive influence on the future of Russia and her peoples. This is why the U.S.A. interests them more than any other Western country. Next come Germany and Great Britain. So far as my observations go, the rest of Europe hardly arouses any interest in the Soviet man and is often despised for its "impotence."

Whether a new world war would rally Soviet people behind their government as did Hitler's invasion, or whether it would set in motion the revolutionary spirit in Russia, as did the First World War, depends, in my opinion, to no small extent on American policies. At present the Soviet man does not know where he stands with the United States, and this makes for distrust rather than confidence. Generalities about the workings of democracy, which are broadcast by various information services outside the Soviet Union carry little conviction with the Soviet citizen. These generalities are unrelated to his political experience and, besides, offer no answer to his query about what he may expect from the West in the event of World War III.

The Soviet man's attitude toward Western culture is more varied and more difficult to define than his attitude in the sphere of politics. Soviet people are less hermetically sealed off from Western culture than they are from virtually all reliable knowledge about the workings of the Western democracies. Translations of the major works of many leading Western writers, including Sinclair Lewis, Hemingway, Thomas Mann, Galsworthy, Romain Rolland, to mention a few, are available in the Soviet Union and find an avid audience. But the productions of Western art and literature are so cleverly sifted by the Soviet authorities that the average Soviet citizen has a completely distorted picture of West-European and American culture. Modern Western philosophy is unknown even to the educated Soviet citizen. Psychoanalysis, which had and is still having such a deep influence on Western ideas of human nature and its hidden impulses, is known, at most, only by name. Western art and literature are presented either as the product of class struggle or as evidence of the moral decadence of the Western bourgeoisie. By a skillful selection of authors and works for translation and by appropriate emphasis by Soviet literary critics, the impression is created that the "more progressive" elements in West-European and American society are disgusted with conditions in their own countries. A young Soviet writer, now in exile, whom I asked whether back home he and his friends actually believed all this, thought my question preposterous—"What else could he believe?"

I am not sure that this opinion represents the majority view. The continued fight conducted by Soviet propaganda against those who are described as "contaminated by Western influences" is ample evidence that a certain portion of the Soviet population, especially the intellectuals, are receptive to Western ideas and influences.

Soviet youth has always displayed a great interest in Western literature. The novels of Theodore Dreiser, Dos Passos, and Hemingway are avidly read by Soviet youth, not because these authors are hailed by Soviet critics as "progressive," but because their works reveal to the reader a new world and convey a sense of that individualism, refinement, and many-sidedness which are the hallmarks of Western civilization.

But interest, even a sympathetic interest in the Western World, its culture, art, and literature, does not necessarily indicate a recognition of Western cultural superiority. One of the main characteristics of the Russian people is their inclination to view man, life, and human society as an "organic whole" and subordinate all their opinions to one fundamental principle—religion, a political doctrine, some moral code, or abstract ideal. This is why, as a rule, they see no great merit in that rich differentiation which is one of the most characteristic features of today's Western culture. They like it for the change it provides, but miss the guiding principle in it, and are inclined to regard it as variety for variety's sake.

I have found little evidence warranting the assumption that a better knowledge of Western culture would increase the Soviet man's respect and liking for this culture. In any case, such an assumption is not borne out by the attitude displayed by most Soviet anti-Communist exiles. Western individualism shocks them by what they consider to be its excesses. Sexual freedom is regarded as a sign of demoralization. They think that the press should not be so "absolutely" free as it is in the countries of the democratic world. They are pained to discover that people read less in the Western World than they do in the Soviet Union. That an artist, a writer, or a teacher should earn less than a shopkeeper is regarded as a "cultural monstrosity." I hardly need add that virtually all Soviet exiles in the United States deplore the fact that American television programs are made up mostly of what they regard as "trash." Paradoxical though this may sound, I am convinced that the lack of true information about Western culture often exercises a favorable rather than an unfavorable influence on the Soviet citizen's attitude toward the West.

While considering the Soviet man's attitude toward Western culture, it is appropriate to mention his attitude toward Western technology. Foreign movies, American cars, the products of German, British, and above all, American industries enjoy great popularity with most people in the Soviet Union. In spite of the assertions

of Soviet propaganda that the Soviet Union is in every respect the world's most advanced country, nearly all Soviet people are convinced of Western, especially American, industrial and technological superiority. The products of Western industries enjoy extraordinary popularity with the Soviet people and doubtless exercise a positive influence on their general attitude toward the West. But the high opinion which they have of Western technology is only vaguely connected in their minds with culture in general. Their experience with Nazi Germany gave them ample evidence that a highly advanced technology can exist side by side with political and cultural savagery.

However, I believe that there does exist a certain affinity for Western culture among considerable numbers of Soviet intellectuals. Preoccupation with modern science and technology, of which the Soviet people absorb a good deal, tends to have a fairly similar effect on most of the people who study them. It takes a subtle and trained mind to master the complexities of modern science, and acuteness of intellect is the enemy of dogmatism and rigid discipline. It is this circumstance that creates the affinity between many Soviet and Western intellectuals. The sympathy for Western culture is strengthened rather than weakened by the denunciations of official propaganda, which create a sense of militant community among all those who are the targets of these denunciations.

I believe that the existence of this affinity explains why Western music (including jazz), art, and literature enjoy great popularity with Soviet intellectuals. But the appeal of a subtle and refined Western culture is limited. The similarity between the Soviet intellectual and his west-European or American counterpart is mainly confined to certain common intellectual characteristics and dispositions.

In the last thirteen years the Soviet people have been offered so many proofs that living conditions are better in the non-Communist countries that no amount of Soviet propaganda can convince them to the contrary. They saw the Baltic States and Eastern Poland in 1940-41. Later they saw Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany. And they remember Lend-Lease. Personal observations naturally carry more weight for the Soviet man than the broadcasts of Radio Moscow. These observations have made him very critical of the Soviet economic system.

A part of the Soviet population tends to blame Russia's economic backwardness on history rather than on the Soviet system, on the inheritance from Tsarist Russia, on the devastation of the Civil

War, on the Second World War, and on the necessity of diverting the lion's share of the national income to armament. But I believe the greater part of the population blames the low living standards in their country on the defects of the Soviet economic system and regards some measure of economic liberalism as "the right economic policy."

Under the vague term of "economic freedom," the Soviet man understands an economy that is less rigidly controlled by the state than the Soviet economy, that offers more scope for private initiative, and gives more attention to the needs of the general consumer. He usually assumes that these features are among the main distinguishing characteristics of the Western economic systems. Having but little information about the functioning and the specific features of the various economic systems in different countries of the Western World, he tends to lump them together as just "freer systems" than his own. This freedom appeals to him. He knows from experience the drawbacks that result from the unwieldiness and inflexibility of the Soviet economy. Besides, he has seen with his own eyes that the introduction of Soviet economic methods in the satellite countries and in Eastern Germany has brought about a general lowering of living standards. This experience is an object lesson that carries conviction.

All this however, does not mean that the Soviet people would favor the introduction in their country of a free economy on the American model. Even when discussing Western economic systems Soviet people tend to apply their own customary yardsticks. Most Soviet people with whom I have discussed Russia's economic plight expressed the view that what Russia needs is "economic reforms" or "improvements" in the existing system. Usually they favor an economy that is midway between American economic liberalism and Soviet centralization. A certain measure of free enterprise is commonly regarded as necessary for general economic betterment. There is also agreement that the state should take a smaller part of the national income than does the Soviet government. The overwhelming majority of the peasants are in favor of parcelling out the collective farms among individual farmers.

Usually a favorable attitude towards what is regarded as Western economic liberalism is blended with thoroughly Soviet economic ideas. Thus, several Soviet-educated engineers and economists expressed to me the view that the principal defect of the Soviet economic system lay in "too rigid controls over the managers of Soviet

industry" and thought that conditions would improve immensely if these managers were given a freer hand in planning and directing production. In their opinion the economic weakness of Stalinism was not state ownership of natural resources and industry, but over-centralization and too little scope for individual initiative within the state-owned economy. As Soviet-educated people, they took it for granted that a country's natural resources and principal industries must be state-owned. They viewed their country's most important economic problem not as state ownership versus private ownership, but as economic "centralism" versus decentralization. I have often heard from sincere Soviet anti-Communists the opinion that what was needed to improve conditions in Russia was a "consumer goods five-year plan."

In brief, in much the same manner as do most citizens of other countries, the Soviet man thinks of his country's economic problems in terms of the existing economic realities and practical results. He is more of a revolutionary in politics than in economics.

The Soviet man's political and economic notions have an important bearing on his ideas about social justice. He resents the rights which the Soviet state has assumed over his personal resources and private life. And yet he takes it for granted that the "good" government of his wish-dreams will take over all the duties performed by the Soviet government and be responsible for the administration of social justice in the broadest sense of the term. He assumes that under a free economy the government would guarantee good jobs and good wages to everyone, provide better old-age pensions than does the Soviet government, as well as free medical care, insurance against sickness and accidents, free tuition, etc. In other words what he regards as a fair social and economic system is an idealized picture which combines all the positive features of the welfare state with all the advantages of a free economy. Since this is apparently impossible, most Soviet exiles usually end up in disillusionment both with Socialism and with the principles underlying the economic systems in most of the countries of the free world. That the poor man in the U.S.A. is not entitled—at least in theory—to exactly the same medical care as the rich is regarded as shocking injustice and often denounced as "social backwardness." The prosperous American insurance business was described to me by a Soviet anti-Communist exile as "profit-making on other people's misfortunes." The ease with which an employer can fire his employee is deplored as "complete insecurity." Less responsible Soviet immigrants denounce

these features of a free economy as "social and economic backwardness." The more thoughtful tend to reach the conclusion that genuine social justice lies somewhere midway between complete economic freedom and too rigid state control. Germany, which is nearer the concept of the welfare state than the United States, usually finds more favor with the Soviet exile.

Finally, I would like to stress the importance of one more element in the Soviet man's attitude toward the West: it is the ambivalent character of this attitude, which is a blend of attraction and repulsion. Soviet people are not only acutely aware of Western economic and technological superiority, but are also very sensitive on this point. The realization of another country's superiority over one's own is apt to provoke a hostile reaction rather than the desire to imitate. Often both elements are present, and while the cultural features of a technologically more advanced civilization are rejected, even scoffed at, those features which make for material strength are eagerly assimilated. I believe that this is the prevalent disposition of most Asians toward Western civilization. In a large degree this also holds true of the Soviet man's attitude toward the West. It is a mixture of an inferiority complex with a tendency to over-compensation. Soviet people are extraordinarily sensitive to every outward sign of that lack of refinement which is so typical of everything Soviet from manners to clothing and cars. The first call of a great many Red Army officers and non-coms in the Baltic States and Eastern Poland in 1940 was at a tailor's. They were ashamed of the clumsy cut of their uniforms and the poor fabric of which they were made. But this did not make them humble. On the contrary, while ordering new uniforms and buying up the products of Western industry, most of them went out of their way to stress the cultural superiority of the Soviet Union. This was more than simple slogan peddling. They needed the comforting thought of their alleged cultural superiority to soothe the irritation caused by countless proofs that they were members of an economically and technologically backward country. The theme of the alleged Russian superiority over the West, so insistently harped upon by Soviet propaganda, is not empty boasting: it is clever political exploitation of a very important psychological trait.

During the war I had many opportunities to watch the reactions of Soviet audiences (including Red Army prisoners of war) to German propaganda, and I discovered a very uniform reaction pattern: addresses, newspaper articles, and broadcasts which stressed German

cultural, industrial, economic, or military achievements were received with indifference or hostility, even if the speaker or writer implied that after the defeat of Communism the peoples of Russia would share in the fruits of all these achievements. Only those Germans who showed genuine and sincere humility and paid tribute to Russia's greatness won the sympathy of the population in the German-occupied areas of the Soviet Union. Yet once they were won over, the Russians showed admirable devotion to those whom they trusted and liked.

The ambivalent character of the Russian people's attitude toward the West, coupled with a tendency to accept the view that wars are political showdowns and that an "internationalization of loyalties" is perfectly legitimate conduct makes the Soviet man very receptive to clever political propaganda. The mass surrenders of the Red Army soldiers in the early stages of the Second World War were a striking illustration of the Soviet citizen's inclination to push his sympathies for the West to great extremes. Yet this ambivalence also holds the danger of an anti-Western explosion comparable to the fury with which the Russian soldier fought Hitler's armies, when he realized that the Nazis despised him and intended to subjugate his fatherland. Whether the positive or negative trend will prevail in the Soviet citizen's present attitude toward the West will largely depend on the policies which the Western World, and above all the United States, adopt toward the Russian people in the present cold war. So far, I have discovered no reason for optimism.

Emigré Anti-Soviet Enterprises and Splits

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE city of Munich, capital of Bavaria, now rising like a phoenix from wartime destruction, is a main centre of anti-Soviet political activity, conducted by Russian and other refugees from the Soviet Union. Although most of the hundreds of thousands of political fugitives from the Soviet Union, from Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic States and from other areas which fell under Communist domination during the war have now been resettled, political activity continues unabated. In some respects there has been progress and expansion, by comparison with the situation which I found in Munich during a visit in 1951.

A long cherished aspiration of anti-Soviet Russians and of Americans sympathetic with freedom for the Soviet peoples was realized last March, when the headquarters of the radio station *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation) was set up on the outskirts of Munich. A research institute for the study of the history and culture of the Soviet Union, staffed by refugee scholars, has considerably expanded the scope of its work and the number of its publications. These cover a wide range of subjects. The Soviet judicial system is one subject; the planning of scientific work, on the basis of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, is another. There are detailed analyses of Soviet war finances and of recent Soviet agricultural developments.

The research institute has the benefit not only of printed Soviet material, which is available to Russian scholars elsewhere in Europe and in America, but also of the personal experience of its members, of whom many have worked in Soviet government offices and educational institutions. As in the case of all totalitarian régimes, this personal experience is often a useful and necessary check on official claims.

Radio broadcasting and research in Soviet political and economic conditions are functional activities which are developing as well as could be expected with the aid and support of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. This is an organization, composed of Americans interested in the cause of freedom for the

peoples of the Soviet Union, and now headed by retired Admiral Leslie Stevens, former American naval attaché in Moscow.

But another cause which this Committee has tried to advance has not fared so well. This is the combination in a single organization, with a joint platform, of representatives of all Soviet refugee groups, Russian and non-Russian, with the exception of pro-Communists, Fascists and Monarchists, who are regarded by the Committee as a liability, rather than an asset, in a united front.

This effort ran into many snags from the beginning and the Coordinating Centre which was finally set up in Munich soon split into two warring and irreconcilable groups. For the time being the attempt to create a united political representation for the political emigration from the Soviet Union has been shelved and attention is being concentrated on practical enterprises, such as the radio station, broadcasting in Russian and in some of the languages of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A visit to the editorial section of the station (the transmission is from another part of Germany) reveals an atmosphere of pioneering enthusiasm among the 250 persons, of whom 25 are Americans, who are taking part in the operation. To anyone who has lived in Russia and sensed the iron weight of a single propaganda viewpoint, hammered in with every resource of the printed and spoken word, there is something thrilling in this spectacle of the "Radio Liberation"—David going forth to battle with the Soviet mass indoctrination Goliath.

"*Govorit radio-stantsia osvobodzhdenie*" ("Radio Liberation speaking")—with this introduction the station, on the air since March 1, 1953, begins its daily round of news broadcasts, commentary, and analysis and cultural features. By coincidence, the station began to operate just before the death of Stalin—an event which furnished abundant material for discussion.

My visit to Munich coincided with the fall of Lavrenti Beria, and I can testify, after sitting in on editorial councils and listening to some broadcast deliveries, that the station made the most of this opportunity. A former actor in the Moscow Art Theatre, the finest school of perfect enunciation of the Russian language, delivered a fifteen minute talk on the theme that the downfall of Beria indicates the chronic state of internal tension and masked intrigues and struggle for power in the Kremlin, ending his broadcast with this suggestive question:

"Whose turn is next? Molotov? Bulganin? Or perhaps Malenkov himself?"

The station also put on the air an ironical recording of Beria's own voice, declaring, after the death of Stalin:

"Anyone who is not blind sees that our Communist Party is united and unconquerable." Comment on this, after Beria's own speedy "liquidation," was superfluous.

Some of the scripts are prepared in the office of the station, by Russian and other Soviet refugees of the older as well as of the more recent emigration. Some are prepared in New York. During the time of the uprising against the Communist régime in East Germany and of Beria's subsequent downfall, many of the broadcasts endeavored to drive a wedge between the Red Army and the Soviet régime.

The primary targets of the station are the Soviet officers and soldiers in Germany. At the time when the Soviet troops were called in to quell the June uprising, which had got out of hand for the East German puppet government, a representative of Station Liberation was in Berlin, eager to try the experiment of broadcasting in Russian to Soviet troops from the Western sector of Berlin. The American commandant vetoed this idea, fearing that the Soviet troops would cross the sector boundary in an attempt to seize the sound truck from which the broadcast would take place and thereby create a serious incident.

Several precautions are taken to keep the broadcasts realistic and up-to-date. Soviet broadcasts are monitored; Soviet newspapers are carefully read for suggestions of new trends in politics and economics. The opinions and reactions of the newer refugees are taken into account.

For example, one broadcast, given in the presence of some Red Army officers who had fled to the West, declared that the peoples of Russia had been thrown back to the times of Ivan the Terrible. The officers were not favorably impressed. Although they disliked the Soviet régime enough to escape at the risk of their lives, they felt a kind of Soviet patriotism, a pride in some of the industrial and technical achievements of the last decades. Every such indication of a psychological mood in the Soviet population is taken into account in the preparation of broadcasts.

There is a consistent attempt to play up the contrast between the creative achievements of the Russian and other Soviet peoples and

the repressive aspects of Communist dictatorship. For example, one broadcast was devoted to the poems, forbidden in the Soviet Union, of Anna Akhmatova, victim of a Soviet cultural purge.

I found in the headquarters of the radio station an elderly French-speaking Georgian journalist who was delivering broadcasts in his native language to his native country. There are also broadcasts in the Armenian and Azerbaidjan Tatar languages, and in several of the languages of Central Asia. No Ukrainian cooperation in the station had been attained last summer.

What is the practical value of this experiment in radio psychological warfare? That the Soviet authorities take it seriously is evident from the fact that thirteen sources of jamming the broadcasts have been identified, as against the three transmitters at the disposal of the station. Technicians at the station, however, are confident that means of avoiding or at least minimizing the jamming have been worked out.

The Soviet Union is much more isolated from the outside world than the East European satellite states. It is only natural that there is much less public reaction to the "Liberation" broadcasts than the Free Europe Committee, which also maintains its headquarters in Munich, receives from its broadcasts to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. There is an amazing quantity of outspoken letters from Poland, indicating either that the Poles are exceptionally reckless or that postal censorship functions rather inefficiently.

Now and then, however, a Red Army "defector" turns up in West Berlin and reports that he was influenced by the broadcasts in Russian which he heard. I talked with one young officer of this type who had quickly found a job as a Russian broadcaster for the Voice of America. The Munich office of this organization is in charge of militant anti-Communists and their broadcasts in Russian keep up a steady critical barrage against the official Soviet broadcasts.

It was an instructive experience to hear the head of the Russian desk in the Voice of America coach the young former Soviet officer in how to put just the right inflection of sarcasm into a script commenting on the Soviet government's refusal to let Soviet chess players go to New York after they had been refused permission (in reprisal for similar restrictions on Americans in Moscow) to live in the carefully guarded Soviet rest home in Glen Cove, Long Island. The Voice of America suggested that the chess players would have been under close guard in the rest home and that the Soviet author-

ities preferred to default on a chess match, rather than to run the risk of losing a few chess players by defection.

The Soviet ex-officer gave a picture of Soviet life, and of the grievances and aspirations of the Soviet peoples very similar to the general pattern of refugee impressions. The most hated feature of the Soviet system, he believed, was the collective farm. This should be replaced by individual farming or by voluntary cooperatives. There should be a return to private initiative in small industry and private trade, while big industrial enterprises, built since the Revolution, should remain under some form of state operation. The people would wish to preserve the larger educational opportunities and the measures of social security which have been introduced since the Revolution, while making a clean sweep of slave labor, concentration camps, espionage, and terrorism.

My visit to Munich in July, 1953, coincided with the most serious of many crises that have beset the attempts of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism to promote and foster united action among émigré groups. After many nerve-wracking conferences among Russian and non-Russian political groups in Europe, after many false hopes that ended in disillusionment a Coordinating Centre for anti-Bolshevik Struggle was brought into existence in Munich at the end of 1952.

This Centre included several of the more active Russian political groups, such as the SBONR (Union for Struggle for Free Russia), a group largely composed of former supporters of the former Red Army General Andrei Vlasov, who tried to organize an anti-Soviet movement among Russian war prisoners, the Democratic League, an organization of Russians in America with a Menshevik-Socialist Revolutionary coloration, the Narodniki, a group in which Alexander Kerensky played a prominent part which seceded from the League and the Union of Struggle for the Freedom of Russia, headed by the elderly Professor Melgounov, in Paris. The NTS (People's Toiling Union or Solidarists), one of the more active Russian political organizations, had been inclined to play an in-and-out game during the negotiations for the organization of the Centre, showing some suspicion of the attitude of the American Committee toward the nationality question. The Centre also included some organizations of the non-Russian nationalities, although not the largest and most representative. Despite sincere and protracted efforts, it proved impossible to obtain for the Centre any Ukrainian cooperation,

except for very weak and unimpressive groups headed by a former officer, Gulai, and a chess player named Bogatyrchuk.

Outside the Centre remained the stronger and more representative groups of the non-Russian nationalities. These groups, known as the Paris Bloc, included the Ukrainian National Rada, the Byelorussian National Rada, the Armenian Dashnak Party, and national committees representing Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and the North Caucasus.

Representatives of the Paris Bloc came to Munich last summer and there was an effort, with the friendly and disinterested mediation of representatives of the American Committee, to find a formula for common action in the struggle against Communism. The American Committee, incidentally, has long been the favorite target for splenetic attacks by almost all refugee groups, from conservative Russian nationalists to extreme Ukrainian separatists.

No doubt some actions and policies of the Committee are liable to legitimate questioning and criticism. One of its obvious weaknesses is the fact that there are simply not enough trained experts in Russian language, history, and culture, and Soviet political institutions to satisfy the needs of all the organizations, public and private, which require Russian specialists.

But, despite the verbal brickbats which are hurled at it from two opposite sides, the Committee has consistently and carefully steered clear of the two extreme viewpoints of denying that there is a nationality problem in the Soviet Union or of accepting at face value the independence and territorial claims of émigré spokesmen for the non-Russian nationalities. The Committee has taken its stand on the middle ground of two principles: self-determination for all peoples in the Soviet Union and no "predetermination" of their political status or frontiers.

Unfortunately, it proved impossible to obtain agreement along these lines among the groups of Soviet political exiles. The Coordinating Centre itself broke into two groups. In one of these was the majority of the Russian organizations, reinforced by the NTS. In the other was the Democratic League, headed by Boris Nikolaevsky and the majority of the non-Russian groups. It proved impossible, despite long and arduous negotiations, to patch up this split or to draw the Paris Bloc into agreement with the Russian organizations. The American Committee finally suspended aid to both "Centres," on the ground that neither could be considered fully representative.

There were two formal causes of the split in the Centre. One was

the insistence of the Russian organizations on co-opting for membership certain nationality groups with federalist programs. The other was insistence on the part of the Russian organizations that plebiscites or other means of determining the desires of the non-Russian peoples should be carried out only after the entire territory now under Soviet rule is liberated from Communism.

A basic difficulty in the way of establishing a united anti-Communist front is the deep ingrained suspicion which certainly prevails among Russian and non-Russian nationality group leaders. Whether this same sentiment prevails among the peoples of the Soviet Union who, in the long run, will decide the question of federalism or separatism is a matter of disagreement and hot debate.

Moreover, Soviet political refugee leaders are inclined to take themselves very seriously. The meetings which have been held in various German towns, Fuessen, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, Tegernsee, have been caricatures of European international conferences. Every point has been stubbornly debated, as if the destiny of millions depended on how a certain principle was phrased. Common sense might suggest that under present conditions the important thing is to organize measures for anti-Communist activity, not to wrangle about what may happen if and after the Soviet régime is overthrown.

But common sense is rarely the characteristic of the political emigrant. The situation is also obscured by much embittered personal bickering. Late in 1952 a congress of Soviet postwar political emigrants was held under the leadership of the former Soviet officer, Gregory Klimov, author of the recent book, *The Terror Machine*. Klimov is one of the more energetic of the recent refugees.

But the magazine, *Kolokol* ("The Bell"), also purporting to represent postwar refugees, takes a very dark view of Klimov and of the methods by which his congress was organized and conducted. To quote one indignant writer in *Kolokol*, "The congress was created by Klimov for purposes connected with his personal career, and he achieved this only by means of intrigue, cunning, bribery, blackmail, promises and threats."

This is rather characteristic of the polemical style of the present Russian emigrant publications, which in this respect carry on the traditions of their predecessors in Tsarist times.

An outsider hesitates to take sides or to pass judgment in these violent feuds and quarrels. But it seems safe to hazard the prediction that no real or lasting unity can be built up in the present heated atmosphere of emigrant politics.

On the other hand, functional enterprises like the radio station "Liberation" and the research institute in Munich have proceeded quite smoothly and successfully. Here is perhaps a lesson for American friends of freedom for the Russians and the other peoples under Soviet rule. To begin with projects of far-reaching political unity and cooperation is to invite endless bickering and frustration. There is far more promise in supporting impartially and individually any group that is able to smuggle leaflets into the Soviet Zone of Germany or to carry out any other form of practical anti-Communist work. The radio station "Liberation" is carrying on useful political warfare; Radio Moscow and the radio stations of the satellite states no longer have a monopoly on subversive broadcasts. Much material is coming to light about Soviet conditions as a result of the Munich research institute and similar enterprises. Even some of the difficulties and fiascos in political activity throw useful light on the psychology of the newer Soviet refugees.

In almost every European capital one finds individuals and groups of people who have lost homes and possessions as a result of the Revolution or of subsequent Communist oppression and who are doing everything in their power to hasten the day of liberation. In ancient Istanbul I enjoyed a long conversation with Professor Maksudi, a Volga Tartar who had once been a leader of the nationality bloc in the Tsarist Duma. Now a member of the Turkish Parliament, Professor Maksudi has lost none of his political zest or his interest in the fate of his countrymen.

Communist methods have sown a dragon seed of embittered rebels which may some day yield an unexpected harvest. This is a consideration that should outweigh the discouragement which is sometimes excited by the rather naive intrigues and juvenile personal quarrels that crop up in the atmosphere of refugee politics.

"Peace" in Soviet Strategy

BY PHYLLIS A. GREENLAW

I

TRADITIONALLY, peace has been thought of negatively as the absence of war between sovereign states. However, in this century the concept has been expanded and given quite opposite content by two opposing forms of internationalism. One, Western internationalism, is democratic and evolutionary, looking ultimately toward the attainment of an effective and just world peace in which law and order would be maintained, which might be expected to result in security and freedom from fear for individuals throughout the world. The other, Communist internationalism, is dictatorial in form and revolutionary in method, having as its objective the establishment of a World Communist State under the ruthless dictatorship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It pursues "peace," meaning the absence of international war, but not only does not exclude, but indeed encourages civil wars and other violence during the period of the world revolution. Human beings are not looked upon as individuals, but rather as minute and expendable parts of "the masses," and man's every freedom is completely subordinate to the whims and dictates of Communist society.

It should be made clear, that it is not capitalism that is the fundamental good to be preserved at all costs against the onslaught of Communism, as the Communists keep insisting, but rather the essential difference between the two systems, and that which we seek to save, pertains to the dignity and worth of the individual and the relation of the individual to the state in the democratic system. Nor is national sovereignty of value in itself. Quite the contrary: it is increasingly recognized that it is an outmoded concept, giving way gradually to a growing, genuine, spirit of internationalism. We now have embryonic international organizations which we hope will eventuate, before it is too late, in a supranational organization which can be expected to establish and maintain the peace of a just civil order on a world scale. Thus, we often favor, and must agree to further limitations on national sovereign independence. But we want to be certain that it will be superseded, not by the dictatorial, revolutionary, Communist world state, to which human beings are objects of little worth, but by our Western form of internationalism

and supranational organization, in which individuals may be ever more effectively protected and efficiently served.

It should also be made clear before entering upon the following study, that when Communists use the word "socialism" for their system it is, and they intend it to be, entirely antithetical to the "democratic socialism" of Great Britain and other Western European nations, which they include in "the capitalist system." Communist "socialism" is that particularly ruthless stage in the achievement of Communism which has obtained in Russia since the October Revolution.

Surely, then, the achievement of the Communist objective—to organize the entire world under their sanguinary "dictatorship of the proletariat" of the U.S.S.R.—could not provide the kind of peace for which free men are searching. For, although after completion of the revolutions throughout the world, that is, after a long series of inevitable civil wars and other somewhat less violent but equally effective forms of struggle to overthrow the existing economic and political systems, order might result, we can be quite sure that there would not be justice and security for the individual. After this long series of revolutionary wars and the establishment of the dictatorship there might well not be international wars as we have known them in the past, for there would no longer be sovereign nation-states, but also lacking would be all freedom for human self-achievement, all freedom for "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

II

An understanding of basic Communist theory is of primary importance because this theory provides the foundation for Soviet strategy which in turn underlies all Soviet "peace" moves. As we shall see later, these moves are tactics, and so are entirely subservient to the overall strategy.

To Communists, their theory is not "just theory," but rather it is a science upon which action is to be based. Stalin, in *Leninism*, stressed Lenin's view that "without a revolutionary theory, there cannot be a revolutionary movement," pointing out that "theory becomes the greatest force in the working-class movement when it is inseparably linked with revolutionary practice; for it, and it alone, can give the movement confidence, guidance, and understanding of the inner links between events; it alone can enable those engaged in the practical struggle to understand the whence and the whither of

the working-class movement." It is to the correctness of the theory as expounded by these leaders that Communists give much credit for their strength and success, and exhortations to study the theory and to fight for its realization are often given. For example, a leading article in the April 17, 1953, issue of the Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, states that "the entire history of the international Communist movement for the past fifty years is indissolubly linked with the immortal names of Lenin and Stalin, the great leaders and teachers of the working people of the world," and stressed to all Communists the necessity of "adequate theoretical training," pointing out at the same time that "it is not enough for a Party member . . . merely to accept the programme, it is necessary to fight for its realization, to be an active fighter for the cause of the Party, . . . the Party which is revolutionary to the end." The objective is "to ensure the complete triumph of the ideas and cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

From a study of this theory it becomes clear that there is virtually no place for true peace in the picture, but rather we must face the fact that its elements are class struggle, civil war, violent revolution, destruction, and ruthless dictatorship.

Basic to the ideology of the Communist Party is Marxian Dialectical Materialism. The dialectic is essentially a method of reasoning in which the existing thought or condition, the thesis, contains within itself its opposite or contradiction, the antithesis, and with the growth of the contradiction the original thought or condition is destroyed, resulting in a new synthesis. Marx translated this into social-political terms, and combined it with philosophic materialism, or economic determinism, which is based upon the belief that material conditions and economic factors essentially determine man's activity and thought. Applied to the study of social life and the history of society, Marxian Dialectical Materialism is the basis of the Communist analysis of world forces. It is, therefore, in the words of Stalin, "immensely important" in determining the "practical activities of the party of the proletariat." The dialectic, "the contradiction within the very essence of things," proves the necessity of revolution, the impossibility of evolution.

For nature, in the Communist view, is a connected, integrated, organic whole, in which "something is always rising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away." The struggle between the "opposites" or "internal contradictions" inherent in all things and phenomena of nature "constitute the internal content of

the process of development." In pseudo-chemical terms, this process is a passing "from insignificant . . . quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes . . . which occur . . . abruptly . . . as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes." Stalin concluded that therefore,

if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon. Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change in the capitalist system, by revolution.

The exploiting capitalist system, then, is the thesis or existing condition, slowly decaying and crumbling, while the proletariat, its antithesis or contradiction, is growing and becoming conscious of its rôle. A "most acute class struggle" between the two develops, and capitalism becomes "pregnant with revolution." Chronic civil war is prevented only for a time by the creation of a monopoly of force by the dominating bourgeoisie in the organized capitalist state, "a machine for the oppression of one class by another." The capitalist state is, therefore, the prime target for revolution; it must be destroyed.

When the contradiction is complete, the revolutionary crisis occurs. The old system is shattered, and the synthesis, the new system, is established under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxist "laws of development" decree that this is inevitable; capitalism cannot be patched up by reforms, but must be destroyed. Its internal contradiction breaks it up, then the dictatorship of the proletariat, "untrammelled by law and based on violence," liquidates any remains. The Cominform journal in April, 1953, stressed that Communists must understand these "laws of social development" for "the better they know them, the clearer for them is the aim and ways of achieving this aim, the more active and bolder will they be in fighting for the cause of the Party."

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, capitalism apparently underwent further growth than Marx had expected. Lenin, therefore, found it necessary to develop his theory of imperialism, to explain the new characteristics of the capitalist world. This theory still underlies Soviet thinking about international affairs and so is essential to an understanding of the Communist view of war and peace. In the "period of imperialism," according to the Communist

analysis, monopoly replaces competition and the "concentration of the means of production, the enormous socialization of labor, the growth of labor organizations" are "creating the material prerequisites for Socialism." The Program of the Communist International in 1928 continued:

The epoch of imperialism at the same time intensifies the antagonisms among the "Great Powers" and gives rise to wars which cause the break-up of single world economy. Imperialism is therefore moribund and decaying capitalism. It is the threshold of world social revolution.

Directly in line with this analysis, Stalin declared in his famous speech on February 6, 1946, which set the stage for post-war Soviet activity, that just as the First World War arose as a result of the first of the inevitable crises in the development of the capitalist world economy, so "the Second World War arose as a result of the second crisis." He elaborated briefly on this theme in his final work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, published in October, 1952, on the eve of the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It appears now that by the time of that meeting Mr. Malenkov's position had been decided. Not only did he give the report, but also, and this seems even more significant, in the reorganization which then took place only he and Stalin were made members of both the highest organs of the government and of the Party. The elevation of Mr. Malenkov at the same time as the publication of this document does perhaps indicate a certain complicity on the part of Mr. Malenkov, or at the least suggests his agreement with the views there expressed. The fact that this pamphlet is now being translated into every language and studied by all Communist Parties supports this view. It seems worthwhile, then, to look into the analysis of the current international situation handed down in this newest official handbook for revolutionaries, described in the Cominform journal, with Mr. Malenkov's report, as a "new, mighty weapon in the hands of the Communist and Workers' Parties, a guide to action . . . , mighty factors for further activating the Communists and all fighters for peace, for democracy, for socialism. . . ."

First, there is the inevitable economic explanation of events and motives:

The disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market must be recognized as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

The Second World War was itself a product of this crisis. Each of the two capitalist coalitions which locked horns in the war calculated on defeating its adversary and gaining world supremacy. It was in this that they sought a way out of the crisis. The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy.

But the war did not justify these hopes. It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three major capitalist countries: the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France. But at the same time China and other, European, people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system, and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another.

. . . It follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries . . . will not expand, but contract; their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

This is felt by the capitalists themselves. . . . They are trying to offset these difficulties with the "Marshall Plan," the war in Korea, frantic rearmament, and industrial militarization. But that is very much like a drowning man clutching at a straw.

Stalin then concluded that, in view of this state of affairs, two theses, one held by Lenin in 1916—that "in spite of the decay of capitalism, on the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before"—and the other, "expounded by Stalin before the Second World War, regarding the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism," must both now be regarded as having "lost their validity." Instead, he sees growing instability in the capitalist system and stresses the definite shrinking of that part of the world.

The "Inevitability of Wars Between Capitalist Countries" is Stalin's next topic. Although everything seems to be "going well" for the moment among the capitalist countries, Stalin asserts that "it would be a mistake to think that things can continue to 'go well' for 'all eternity,' that these countries [Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France] will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development." He continued:

. . . After the First World War . . . the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be

stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own lives? I think there is no such guarantee.

But it follows from this that the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force.

Nor does the existence of the Communist "peace" campaign nullify this view, for Stalin deprecates the idea "that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defence of peace and against another world war," saying flatly that it "is not true." Stalin explained further:

the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a *particular* war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a *particular* peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally . . . because, for all the success of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force—and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism. (Italics mine.)

Thus, Communists set themselves up as being against these "inevitable" international wars, and claim to lead the forces of "peace," hoping to prevent an international war against the Soviet Union while leading the forces of revolutionary civil war to overthrow the "imperialist powers," abolish "imperialist wars," and establish "peace" under the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Lenin's concept of the Communist Party as organized power, and his insistence on the necessity of leadership to achieve and consolidate the revolution, are his other great contributions to the revolutionary cause. Now, Mr. Malenkov heads this "hard core of professional revolutionaries," bound by "iron discipline and unswerving devotion to the revolution." Mr. Malenkov told the Nineteenth Party Congress the qualities he expects of a Party member:

What the Party needs is not officials steeped in routine, indifferent people who place their personal tranquillity above the interests of the job entrusted to them, but men who place state interests above all and who work devotedly and indefatigably in carrying out the directives of the Party and the Government.

Although revolutionary crises are inevitable, successful revolution is not assured, Lenin and Stalin warned. Rather, "it must be prepared and won" by a strong proletarian revolutionary party. "To transform the world," Stalin told H. G. Wells, "it is necessary to have political power. . . . Revolution means the transference of power from one class to another." In the struggle for this transference of power, the Communist Party is the main guiding force. It is, the April 17, 1953, Cominform journal points out,

under the leadership of the Communist and Workers' Parties and with the constant and fraternal aid of the Soviet Union, [that] the working people of the Chinese People's Republic, the countries of People's Democracy and the German Democratic Republic have achieved big success in the revolutionary transformation of their countries. The Communists headed the struggle . . . [and] their activity and revolutionary tempering grew in the resistance to reaction, in the struggle to smash it and destroy the imperialist agents, the . . . traitors.

While other nations continue to think and act in terms of sovereign states and of traditional international relations, hoping for a true, just, and lasting peace, but without organizing sufficiently to establish and maintain the law and order necessary to achieve it, the Soviet Communists are making use of all the traditional concepts, at the same time pursuing their own aims through their international "monolithic" Communist Party, which efficiently organizes classes and groups irrespective of national boundaries, to prepare revolutions and civil wars for the completion of The Revolution, in all non-Communist states, and the establishment of the world-wide Communist dictatorship. So doing, they have been using an effective double-talk which enlists the support of unwary seekers of peace for the cause of endless class struggle, civil war, conquest, and "liquidation." If there are some who cannot be enlisted for the active fight, then the hope is at least to encourage neutrality, which will prevent interference with the progress of Communist designs for world conquest.

The position and rôle of the Soviet State were defined by Stalin in his theories of Socialism in one Country, Capitalist Encirclement, and the Soviet Union as the Base for World Revolution. With the success of the revolution in one country, the U.S.S.R., it should be consolidated there, he decided, and this was aided by stimulating fear of the dangers of "capitalist encirclement." Then, Stalin asked: "What is our country, 'the country that is building socialism,' if not the base of the world revolution?" Thus, far from meaning that

socialism was to be constructed in Russia, leaving the rest of the world in peace, Stalin decreed that the Soviet state must remain and build ever more gigantic power, to lead the revolution to completion throughout the world.

The impossibility of a lasting peaceful coexistence, between Communism and Capitalism or other non-Communist systems has been recognized by the Communists, notwithstanding their frequent propaganda to the contrary. The Comintern stated unequivocally in 1928 that:

. . . the proletariat in the Soviet Union harbours no illusions as to the possibility of a durable peace with the imperialists. . . . Therefore, the primary duty of the proletariat, as the fighter for socialism, is to make all the necessary political, economic, and military preparations for these wars, to strengthen its Red Army—that mighty weapon of the proletariat—and to train the masses of the toilers in the art of war. There is a glaring contradiction between the imperialists' policy of piling up armaments and their hypocritical talk about peace. There is no such contradiction however, between the Soviet government's preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and a consistent peace policy. *Revolutionary war of the proletarian dictatorship is but a continuation of revolutionary peace policy "by other means."* (Italics mine.)

Thus, if the non-Communist world arms to defend itself against the powerful Red Army, "that mighty weapon of the proletariat," it is attacked as being aggressive and warmongering, while the Soviet Union, striving to complete the world revolution and to extend its dictatorship, can expand "revolutionary peace policy" to include preparation for and waging of civil or "revolutionary war" to destroy the nations of the free world, and still claim to desire "peace." International "imperialist" wars, considered inevitable under the present economic system, are to be replaced by revolutionary civil wars to achieve world-wide Communism.

Similarly, Lenin taught that "whosever wishes durable peace must be for civil war against the governments and bourgeoisie." This applied not only to the proletariat in capitalist countries, but was closely linked through the theory of imperialism to the national liberation movements in the colonies and dependent territories. Communists have worked unceasingly to gain control of these movements to direct them toward "smashing the imperialists," at the same time emphasizing that the break with the oppressors should be followed by "amalgamation" with "that fraternal organization of peoples" the U.S.S.R. and the "people's democracies."

Stalin has pointed out that while conflict with the imperialist

world is "inevitable," it is to Soviet advantage to stave it off until the most advantageous moment,

until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come to a head, or, finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of . . . colonies [or markets]. Therefore, *the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the coexistence of two opposed systems.* (Italics mine.)

But, Stalin also emphasized, Soviet Communists remember that they are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states; and *it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer.* (Italics mine.)

Clearly, from the very foundation of Communist theory, and throughout its development, the concept of a positive, just peace, based upon law and order, is negated; Communist theory is based upon inevitable conflict and revolution. Using the traditional concept of "peace," the absence of international war, in combination with the idea that international war inevitably results from capitalist imperialism, Communists find the waging of civil war and revolution for the destruction of this system entirely consistent with their "revolutionary peace policy." The "peace," "democracy," and "freedom" for which they claim to be fighting are purely class concepts, intimately linked to that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which uses the most violent means and knows no law. A just world peace obviously is quite different from and incompatible with this dictatorship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and its subsidiary organizations, as envisioned in Communist theory.

III

To what extent, then, does Soviet strategy follow the dictates of this theory?

Definitive Communist statements leave no doubt that the strategic objective corresponds directly to the "logical outcome" of the theory; both decree world revolution. A few examples indicate the continuity of this fact. The 1928 program of the Comintern stated plainly: "The ultimate aim of the Communist International is to replace world capitalist economy by a world system of Communism." Similarly, in 1935, Stalin told H. G. Wells that the objective is the "transformation of the world," which requires conquest of power by the proletarian class. And in April, 1953, we noted in the previous

section, the objective remains: "to ensure the complete triumph of the ideas and cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

The revolution having been achieved in one country, the U.S.S.R. then became the Communist "base of operations" for extending the Communist empire. Means to this end were formulated in the strategic plan laid down by Stalin in *Leninism* for the "third stage" of The Revolution which, he said, commenced after the October Revolution in Russia. The plan was as follows:

Aim: consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a stronghold for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. The revolution goes beyond the confines of one country and the period of world revolution commences.

The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries.

Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small peasant masses in the advanced countries and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

Direction of the main blow: the isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats and the isolation of the parties of the Second International which constitute the main support of the policy of compromise with imperialism.

Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement of the colonies and the dependent countries.

It is evident that Stalin envisioned, and pursued, a *continuous* conquest of power. That is the essential content of the doctrine of world revolution.

This third stage was interrupted by World War II, but in most essentials continued again immediately after the war, probably as the fourth stage. Although Stalin did not publish the strategy for this stage as he did for the other three, it might have looked like this:

Aim: to take advantage of favorable conditions following the war to establish people's democracies ("a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat"), and to overthrow imperialism wherever it remains, particularly in the United States, in order to establish a world system of Communism.

The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country (the Communist Party which is all-powerful in the Soviet Union), reinforced by those in the people's democracies as they are established, and the revolutionary movements in all countries, of which the Communist Parties are in control, or are gaining control.

Main reserves: the intellectuals and the semi-proletarian and small peasant masses in the advanced countries, and the liberation movements in the colonies and dependent countries.

Direction of the main blow: the organization of dual power in all countries—immediately in neighboring countries preparatory to the establishment of

people's democracies; and the isolation of the United States from its allies and from the colonies and dependent territories.

Plan for the disposition of forces: cooperation of Communist Parties in neighboring countries with other parties, until the *coups*, and alliance of all Communist Parties with the liberation movements in the colonies and dependent territories, and with all potentially anti-United States groups in the non-Communist countries.

Strategy, as the "science of leadership" in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to seize power, defines the political aims and basic organizational means by which Communist objectives are to be achieved in a particular stage of the revolution. "It changes with the transition of the revolution from one stage to another," Stalin explained in *Leninism*, "but remains essentially unchanged throughout the entire duration of a given stage." This allows for interruption by inevitable imperialist war crises, and the consequent introduction of a somewhat different phase, but means that the basic, ultimate objective is not in the least sacrificed.

The task of the immensely important "strategic leadership," Stalin continued, is to "utilize properly all . . . reserves for the achievement of the basic aims of the revolution at a given stage of development." This function is performed by the international Communist Party, "the highest organization of the proletariat" which "is at the same time a *weapon* in the hands of the proletariat for the achievement of the dictatorship where that has not yet been achieved; for the consolidation and extension of the dictatorship where it has already been achieved."

From experience, Communists have concluded that there are a number of strategic principles which must be observed by revolutionaries if they are to realize their full power potential in the struggle. The forces of the revolution must be mobilized, enemy leadership among the masses destroyed, and acceptance attained by the revolutionary organization, the Communist Party or Communist front, as the legitimate leader of the masses, in order to strike the main blow at the decisive moment with efficient precision. Communists find it imperative to gain access to the large proletarian groups to penetrate and subvert them, by alienating them from their leaders who are directing the masses toward reform, thus "compromising" with the enemy, rather than working for the achievement and consolidation of revolution.

Communists seek power everywhere in society, believing that all social phenomena are permeated by the class struggle and that, as

the Comintern put it, "all class struggle is a political struggle because it is finally a struggle for power." It is in this all-pervasive class struggle for power that the Communist Party seeks to become recognized as the legitimate organization and weapon of the working masses of all countries, to lead them to revolution against their "bourgeois" governments. Although continuing to utilize social turmoil and any spontaneous mass action, by building organs of control and developing centralized organizational leadership by the Party, the emphasis has been increasingly upon the Party and its agencies, upon manipulation from the top, or controlled revolution. This has been perfected as the strategy of dual power—the modern, coup d'état form of revolution which proved so successful in conquering the satellite states.

The dual power strategy implies, essentially, a transitional split of sovereignty. Trotsky formulated it clearly thus:

The political mechanism of revolution consists of the transfer of power from one class to another. . . . The historical preparation of a revolution brings about in the pre-revolutionary period a situation in which the class which is called to realize the new social system, although not yet master of the country, has actually concentrated in its hands a significant share of the state power, while the official apparatus of the government is still in the hands of the old lords. That is the initial dual power in every revolution.

This strategy, we noted above, is of current significance because it is the method of Soviet imperialism in the present phase of the world revolution. It explains why international wars are not necessary for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to extend its control. Revolutionary dissection of the victim state replaces smashing it by old-fashioned "imperialist" conquest. Existing authority in each state is undermined by rallying the allegiance of workers and other groups in it to organs of the revolutionary forces, which are prepared to assume governmental functions as the authority of the legitimate sovereign declines, and to take over the government quickly and completely in a *coup*. Meanwhile, Soviet Communists claim that they, and only they, are for "peace," for they do not need, indeed they are opposed to international wars; they are preparing to extend The Revolution by revolutionary civil wars and coups d'état.

Although there is still emphasis on arming the proletariat and fighting for power against the exploiters, this more efficient, less destructive, "peaceful" dual power method seems definitely to be

the preferred organizational strategy in the current phase of the revolution.

The other principal strategy in this phase has been directed toward the isolation of the United States, with first importance attached to splitting it from Britain, while other countries are being alienated by gaining control and direction of the liberation movements in colonies and dependent territories and of all anti-United States groups in the non-Communist states. This process received emphasis and impetus in 1946 when Stalin reaffirmed the Leninist analysis of capitalism and imperialism, and reiterated his 1922 doctrine of a divided world—that “the states of the world have split into two camps: the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism.” This idea of “two diametrically opposed systems” has been expanded and exploited in the Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, since 1947, when it was incorporated in the manifesto establishing the Cominform.

It was in Mr. Molotov's speech in November, 1947, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution that the Soviet Communists introduced their bid for support from all peace-lovers, seeking at the same time to alienate these people from their governments, and from the United States and Britain.

The strategy of splitting Britain and America apart has emerged particularly clearly in the propaganda of the British Communist Party, which has been seeking to persuade the British government to reject American influence (described in venomous terms) and, abandoning rearmament, to make “peace” with the Communists' camp. Reports in the Cominform journal of Communist tactics in other countries show the world-wide extent of the isolation strategy. The doctrine of a divided world and the strategy of alienating support from the “imperialist powers” and particularly from the United States can also be seen clearly in Stalin's last pronouncement on the international situation in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, discussed in the preceding section.

What, then, is the rôle of the “peace” campaign in this strategic picture? It is a tactical device of primary importance, which appears to have been instrumental to Communist success in pursuing their strategic plans for building situations of dual power and revolution in all countries, and of driving wedges to isolate Britain and the United States in order to precipitate their collapse, while rallying support for the U.S.S.R. There is reason to expect it to continue.

The world revolution considered inevitable in Communist theory

is in full swing, and an alarming degree of success is claimed. For example, an editorial in the April 18, 1952, issue of *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* concluded:

We are living in a period when the forces of peace, democracy and Socialism are growing, becoming stronger everyday; when the old world—the world of capitalism, the world of exploitation, poverty, and war—is disintegrating more and more. This clearly confirms, over and over again, the unshakable correctness of Leninism and serves as precursor to the coming triumph all over the world of the never fading Leninist ideas.

Similarly, Stalin, in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, stressed the contrast between the formation of the "united and powerful" socialist camp confronting the capitalist camp, now suffering from "the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market." Again, on April 24, 1953, the Cominform journal made the alarming, if true, statement that "The popular masses in the capitalist, colonial and dependent countries are beginning to understand more and more clearly that only the policy and actions of the Communists correctly express their basic interests."

Can there be any doubt that Soviet strategy is based directly upon Communist theory? I think not. Nor does there appear to be any reason to suppose that Mr. Malenkov wishes to deviate from the theory in his strategic designs. Rather, the "Communist and Workers' Parties" are still "basing their activity on the effective, all-conquering teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin," according to the leading article in the Cominform journal mentioned immediately above. Thus, we seem justified in concluding that Soviet strategy, as well as Communist theory, is completely antithetical to the idea of a just world peace founded upon law and order and providing security and justice for individuals. Strategy has been increasingly perfected, but it remains essentially the same, still pursuing the objective of the destruction of the capitalist and all non-Communist systems and their "bourgeois" political institutions, in order to establish the so-called "peace" of a world-wide "dictatorship of the proletariat."

IV

A study of the most important of the Communist tactical principles will help to elucidate the nature and rôle of the "peace" campaign, which, as a tactic, is subordinate and subservient to Soviet strategy. Stalin's explanation of tactics in *Leninism* is illuminating:

Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat for the comparatively short period of the ebb or flow of the movement, of the rise or decline of the revolution, the struggle to carry out this line by replacing old forms of struggle and organization by new ones, old slogans by new ones, by combining these forms, etc. . . . The forms of struggle as well as the forms of organization . . . [are] correspondingly changed. . . . The strategic plans remain unchanged.

The fundamental principle being emphasized here is that in order to gain and maintain a position of leadership of the masses, the Party leadership must know how to advance and retreat, how to utilize every favorable circumstance, and to minimize temporary set-backs. That is, the leaders must understand and conform to the "ebb and flow" of the revolution, and master all forms of struggle and organization necessary to achieve the aims set for a particular period of the revolution. This, Stalin explained, means that the tactical leadership must be able

First: to bring to the forefront those forms of struggle and of organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the ebb or flow of the movement, as the case may be. . . .

Second: to locate at any given moment that single link in the chain of events which, if seized upon, will enable us to keep hold of the whole chain and prepare the ground for strategic success.

The chief function of the "peace" campaign has been consistently "to prepare the ground for strategic success," to win the battle of men's minds in order to alienate them from their governments and social systems and to diminish the influence of the United States. It was found that "peace" appeals, movements, and organizations are a form of struggle admirably suited to the present period. With modifications as required, all issues are related to the struggle for "peace." It is the link which is expected to provide the Party with the forces for successful revolution. The recent "peace" moves may well be "that single link in the chain of events which . . . will enable us [the Communists] to keep hold of the whole chain" and thus to keep marching toward achievement of strategic success—world revolution.

Communists warn us that Lenin's ideas are never-fading, always triumphantly guiding the Party toward its goal. His analysis of "The Peace Question" and his tactical advice on "peace" during World War I are, therefore, well worth considering. In his view, the "yearning for peace is one of the most important symptoms of an incipient disappointment in the bourgeois lie concerning war for

'liberation,' 'defense of father-land,' and similar lies." Lenin therefore advised his followers that "... all efforts must be directed towards utilizing the sentiment of the masses in favour of peace . . . to explain to the masses that the benefits they expect from peace cannot be obtained without a number of revolutions."

Thus Lenin perhaps foresaw the possibility of a "peace" campaign and its potential usefulness in the "revolutionary onslaught on capitalist governments, for civil war against the bourgeoisie of all countries, for political power, for the victory of Socialism."

In strict consistency with Lenin's teaching, but with organizational advancement, is Dimitrov's discussion, in his speech to the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, of the necessity for utilizing anti-war sentiment for Communist purposes. He might have been discussing the "peace" fronts of the current campaign:

We must penetrate among the pacifist masses and carry out the work of enlightenment among them, using forms of organization and action which are adapted to the level of consciousness of these masses and which give them the possibility of taking the first step in the effective struggle against war and capitalism. We must take two things into account. The first is that the organization of the pacifist masses cannot and must not be a Communist organization; the second is that in working in this organization Communists must never give up explaining with the greatest possible patience and insistence their own point of view on all the problems of the struggle against war.

The meaning here is that Communists, having made contact with the peace-loving masses by penetrating their organizations and groups, will explain that the overthrow of the capitalist system is necessary to rid the world of imperialist wars, the mere absence of which constitutes "peace," while inciting these masses to rebellion and civil war, and to support of revolutionary Communist coups d'état and subsequent dictatorships. Communists also seek to organize heretofore unorganized groups in order to subvert them.

This accords with Stalin's explanation in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* that "the object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war." If it is successful, he continued, it will result in the prevention or postponement of a "particular war," the "temporary preservation of a particular peace," or perhaps may force the "resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace." Thus far we can agree with Stalin's assertion that "consequently, the aim of this movement is not to

overthrow capitalism and establish socialism—it confines itself to . . . preserving peace.” But if this tactic of winning men’s minds and allegiance is combined with skillful Communist organizational tactics so as to perform their function of “preparing the ground for strategic success,” then “it is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace might develop . . . into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.”

Closely related to the principle of contact with the masses and also evident in the technique of front organizations, is the principle of utilizing unity, by joining with other groups for apparently common purposes when necessary in order to gain or maintain the support of certain mass groups. The principle has been used in many forms at different times, from coalition governments to cooperation with a neighborhood peace committee. The purpose, stated in the 1928 Program of the Comintern, is “to secure predominant influence in the broad mass proletarian organizations.” Thus, following Dimitrov’s rule that Communist influence must not be obviously controlling, the American Communist Party in May, 1950, directed that

every party organization, every club, every section must have a plan for peace. . . . It is now possible to have some type of peace movement, campaign, organization, or committee in every union, church, block, neighborhood, shop department, shift, industry, city, country, State. It seems practical that we should launch, among other things, the election in all organizations of Peace Committees as one of the standing committees.

Communists are directed to unite with anyone and everyone for “peace,” in order to influence as many as possible to the Communist interpretation and line of action. The same order stressed that the movement will in this way be able to draw into it “sincere” persons “who differ on or oppose Communism.”

While seeking to eliminate all parties and leaders which would compromise with the class enemy by seeking reforms, or at least to alienate all toilers from them, in order to make the proletariat revolutionary, Communists can at times accept compromises and reforms which will enable them to further the revolution later, especially to combine legal and illegal work. In *Leninism*, Stalin pointed out that

the revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as a means wherewith to link legal and illegal work, in order to use it as a screen behind which his

illegal activities for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie may be intensified;

and that it is often necessary to follow "a path of reforms and concessions to the non-proletarian classes in order to disintegrate these classes, give the revolution a respite, to collect its forces and prepare the conditions for a new offensive."

This type of maneuvering has been apparent in the "peace" offensive, and the current moves fit into it only too well. We are the class enemy to be "disintegrated" by apparent concessions, behind which another onslaught is being prepared.

When Communists declare that peaceful coexistence and competition between the two systems of Communism and Capitalism are possible, explaining that former notions to the contrary were mistakes, the clue to understanding the apparent contradiction is to be found in the idea of peaceful competition during the period of co-existence, which simply means that international war can be avoided while the victory of Communism is being fought out within each country throughout the world.

The "peace" tactic is an excellent vehicle for the essential principle of combining legal and illegal work, proclaimed "absolutely necessary for every Communist Party" by the Comintern in 1928. Similarly, in the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the basic handbook for all Communist Parties, the example of the Bolshevik Party during the Russian revolutionary period is stressed, describing its illegal activities, hidden behind legal fronts, and concluding with: "The Bolshevik Party started an energetic struggle to convert the legally existing societies into strongholds of our Party." This policy, sometimes called boring from within, was further explained and its extension demanded by Dimitrov in 1935 when he told the Communist International:

Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy. Troy was inaccessible to the armies attacking her, thanks to her impregnable walls. And the attacking army, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve victory until with the aid of the famous Trojan Horse it managed to penetrate the very heart of the enemy's camp. . . .

We must utilize anti-fascist mass organizations as the Trojan Horse. Whoever does not understand such tactics or finds them degrading is a babbler and no revolutionary.

These tactical principles are somewhat clarified when the Communist view of morality is considered. Lenin has explained that Communist morality

is entirely subordinated to the interest of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our morality is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

And what is this class struggle? It is—overthrowing the Tsar, overthrowing the capitalists, destroying the capitalist class. . . . We subordinate our Communist morality to this task. We say: "Morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the toilers around the proletariat, which is creating a new Communist society."

In his report to the Third Cominform Congress in November, 1949, M. Suslov, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, outlined the progress of the "peace" movement, and stressed that its strength and power lie in the fact that "it has assumed an *organized* character. The champions of peace increasingly organize themselves on a local, national, and international scale." Through the creation of World "Peace" Congresses, National "Peace" Conferences, and Local "Peace" Committees, Communists have been able to contact, and organize many heretofore untouched groups, and to penetrate existing organizations which are then rallied in support of the "peace" movement, thus becoming potential weapons of dual power. Both the organization and the propaganda of the campaign have been adapted to the particular conditions of each location and to the various groups to which the appeal is being made, for in all countries, Communists have used these tactical principles to penetrate and subvert organizations and groups of intellectuals, women, youth, and students, as well as workers' organizations.

In the battle for men's minds being waged by the Soviet Communists, they have found in "peace" a slogan with universal appeal. The desire of all peoples for peace is recognized by Communists, who proceed then upon the line laid down by Lenin, that this sentiment must be utilized for revolutionary aims. Agitational propaganda begins to express this desire, and to sow seeds of dissention among the masses, directed against their governments or other leadership, following up with the Communist explanation of the cause of war, and hence, the necessity of overthrowing capitalism and imperialism.

In summary, the strategic importance of the "peace" campaign tactic is that it is designed to camouflage all forms of struggle, which are to be linked to it, and, by utilizing the desire for peace in the revolutionary struggle for Communist "peace," it prepares for the completion of the world revolution. This phase of the revolution is being conducted upon the basis of "peaceful" development through subversion, the creation of instruments of dual power within all non-

Communist states by means of propaganda appeals followed by appropriate forms of organization, finally leading to revolutionary coups d'état. In case this "peaceful" progress of the revolution is interrupted, however, the mighty Red Army stands as "bulwark" of "peace" and weapon of the proletariat. Any attempt of the United Nations to stop this unorthodox aggression, which has aptly been termed "Trojan Horse Imperialism," is immediately branded as "imperialist warmongering" and will be met, Stalin threatened, by "unleashing the lion of revolution throughout the world." If not, the lion continues cunningly to stalk its prey.

The History of the Village of Goriukhino

BY A. S. PUSHKIN

Translated from the Russian
BY THOMAS G. WINNER

Translator's Note. Pushkin wrote the "History of the Village of Goriukhino" during the fall of 1830, while quarantined in Boldino because of a cholera epidemic. The work is unfinished and was first published, with considerable deletions, shortly after Pushkin's death, in the *Contemporary* (vol. VII, 1837).

Thematically the work is closely related to the *Belkin Tales* with which it shares the figure of the lovable, naively ambitious fictitious pseudo-author Ivan Petrovich Belkin. Exactly what Pushkin's intent was in writing this short work has been the subject of considerable debate. The "History" has been interpreted as a satire on Karamzin's or Polevoy's historical writings. The work seems, however, to have a considerably more incidental character. Perhaps Pushkin intended it only as a simple farce, an innocent joke, one of those little smiles at his readers of which Pushkin was so fond. The satirical element seems to be of a rather general nature, concerned with the "delights" of rural existence with which Pushkin was so well acquainted and which he satirized so delightfully in the second chapter of *Eugene Onegin*. The primary satirical theme, however, is quite clearly the pseudo-scholarship of would-be Russian literati; hence the archaic stilted style, the footnotes and other scholarly impedimenta and particularly the sympathetic figure of the likeable, if ridiculous, "author" Belkin.

Along with the good-natured satire on the Belkins of the day there is also woven an element of serious social criticism, particularly in the later sections of the "History" in which the merciless exploitation of the Goriukhinian peasants by their landlord is strikingly described.

Even this short work exhibits Pushkin's many-sided talents, his rich and delightful expressiveness, his humor, his sympathy, his feeling for his locale, his perceptiveness and critical mind, all con-

tribute towards the delightful portrayal of poor Belkin, the good-hearted and hopeful, but hopelessly untalented and stumbling would-be author.

The present translation has followed the text of the Soviet Academy of Sciences edition of Pushkin's complete works (1949).

IF God would send me readers, they might be interested to learn how I decided to write the *History of the Village of Goriukhino*. In order to explain this, I must enter into some preparatory details.

I was born of honest and noble parents in the village of Goriukhino in the year 1801 on the first day of April. I received my elementary education from our village beadle. To this honorable man I am obliged, as a result, for my partiality for reading and for my literary activities in general. My progress was slow but steady and at the age of ten I had already mastered almost all the knowledge which remains in my memory today, a memory weak by nature which, because of my tender state of health, I was not permitted to strain excessively.

The calling of a writer has always seemed to me to be the most enviable of all. My parents, honorable, but simple people, brought up in the old fashioned manner, read nothing. Our house was entirely devoid of books of any kind with the exception of the primer which had been bought for me, calendars, and the *Modern Letter Writer*. For a long time the reading of the *Letter Writer* continued to be my favorite occupation. I knew it by heart and yet every day I discovered new and yet unnoticed beauties in it. After General Plemyanikov, whose adjutant my grandfather had once been, Kurganov¹ seemed to me the greatest of all men. I inquired everywhere about him, but unfortunately nobody was able to satisfy my curiosity. Nobody had known him personally and all my questions were answered only by the assertion that Kurganov had written the *Modern Letter Writer*, which of course I had known quite well beforehand. The story of his life was shrouded in the fog of obscurity like that of some ancient demigod; at times I even doubted the reality of

¹N. G. Kurganov, author of *A Russian Universal Grammar or Universal Letter Writer, Being the Easiest Method of Achieving Complete Mastery of the Russian Language, with Seven Appendices Containing Various Learned, Useful and Amusing Articles* (1769). This book was repeatedly re-published under the short title *Letter Writer* (*kniga-pis'movnik*) and was very popular not only as a grammar, but also as an anthology.

his existence. I fancied his name to be one of invention and the legends about him to be pure myths which awaited only exploration by a new Niebuhr.² However, he continued to stir my imagination. I tried to give this mysterious figure some sort of shape and I finally decided that he must resemble the district assessor Koryuchkin, a little old man with a red nose and sparkling eyes.

In 1812, I was taken to Moscow where I was enrolled in the boarding school of Karl Ivanovich Meier. I remained thus occupied for only three months because school was dismissed before the enemy entered the city and I returned to my village. After the Grand Army had been driven out my parents wished to take me to Moscow again to see if Karl Ivanovich had returned to his former abode or, if not, to enroll me in another school. However, I persuaded my mother to let me remain in the village, for my health did not permit me to rise at seven o'clock in the morning, as was the custom in all boarding schools. Thus I attained my 16th birthday remaining at the level of an elementary education and occupying my time with playing bat-ball, the only science in which I attained sufficient knowledge during my stay in boarding school.

At this time I enlisted as a cadet in the N. infantry regiment, where I served until the year of 18—. The experiences of my army life made few agreeable impressions on me except for my promotion to the rank of officer and my good fortune in winning 240 rubles at a time when I had only 1.60 rubles left in my pocket. The death of my dearly beloved parents forced me to resign from the infantry and to return to my patrimony.

This epoch of my life is so important to me that I intend to enlarge upon it not, however, without first begging the pardon of the indulgent reader for misusing his lenient attention.

It was a dismal autumn day. Arriving at the post station whence I turned off the main road to reach Goriukhino, I hired a carriage and started out on the cart road. Although I am by nature a quiet man, my impatience was so great at the thought of seeing once more the places where I had spent the best years of my life, that I kept prodding my coachman to go faster, now promising him money for vodka, now threatening to thrash him; and since it was more convenient to jab him in the back than to take out my purse, I must admit that I hit him some three times, something which I had never

²Barthold G. Niebuhr (1776-1831), a German romantic historian who, under the influence of Herder and Schlegel, built his *Roman History* on "reconstructed" ancient folk epics and myths.

done before, for the occupation of coachman, I do not know why, had always been particularly attractive to me. The coachman hurried his three horses on but it seemed to me that, as is the custom of most coachmen, he urged his horses on with his voice and much waving of the whip, but simultaneously pulled back on the reins. Finally I saw the Goriukhino grove and ten minutes later I entered the manor yard. My heart pounded. I looked around with indescribable agitation. It was eight long years since I had last set eyes on Goriukhino. The little birch trees which had been planted during my youth near the fence had grown into tall trees full of branches. The garden which used to be decorated by three symmetrical flower beds, through which there stretched a broad road strewn with sand, was now an uncut meadow on which a brown cow was grazing. My little carriage stopped at the front steps. My servant would have opened the doors of the house but they were boarded up, although the shutters were open and the house looked inhabited. An old woman emerged from the servants' quarters and asked whom I wished to see. Learning that the master had arrived she ran back into the house and soon I was surrounded by all the servants. I was touched to the very depths of my heart, by the sight of the well known faces as well as the strange ones and I greeted them all in an amicable fashion. The little boys with whom I used to play at soldiering were full grown peasants and the little girls who used to sit around the floor waiting to be sent on errands were already grown and married women. The men wept. I talked to the women without ceremony. "How old you have grown!" I said. They answered me with much feeling. "How ugly you have grown, little father!" They led me to the rear porch where I was met by my wet nurse who embraced me crying and sobbing as if I were a much suffering Odysseus. The servants ran to heat the bath, the cook who, for lack of anything to do, had grown a beard, offered to prepare dinner, or rather supper, since it was already dusk. A suite of rooms was immediately cleaned for me, the very rooms in which my wet nurse lived with my late mother's servant girls, and thus I found myself in the humble abode of my ancestors and fell asleep in the very room in which, 23 years ago, I had first seen the light of day.

About three weeks passed in various routines. I was busy with the assessors, the marshals of the nobility and various district officials. Finally I took over my patrimony and was initiated into the management of the estate. I began to feel more at ease, but soon the boredom of inactivity began to torment me. I was not yet

acquainted with my good and honorable neighbor N. The duties of a landowner were still completely alien to me. The conversation of my wet nurse, whom I had promoted to housekeeper and steward, consisted of roughly fifteen domestic anecdotes which, though quite interesting, were told by her in so monotonous a fashion, that for me she became only another *Modern Letter Writer*, which I used to know from memory. The real *Letter Writer* which had served me so well in my youth, I found again in the pantry in a pitiful state amidst all kinds of discarded odds and ends. I carried it out to the daylight and began reading it once more, but Kurganov had lost his former fascination for me. I read it through and never opened it again.

In this predicament the idea came to me to try my own hand at writing something. The well-intentioned reader already knows that I was educated in a niggardly fashion. Later on I had no occasion to catch up with the studies which had been neglected in my youth, since until I was sixteen years old I was busy playing with the peasant boys and after that I was continually on the move from district to district, from one lodging to the next, spending my time with Jews and sutlers, playing on ragged billiard tables and marching in the mud.

To this I might add that the calling of a writer seemed to me to be so difficult, so unattainable to the ordinary mortal, that the very idea of taking up the pen frightened me from the beginning. Dared I hope that some day I might be ranked amongst the writers, when even my flaming desire to meet one of them had never been fulfilled? But this reminds me of an incident which I intend to tell as proof of my continued passion for our native letters.

In 1820, while I was still a cadet, I happened to be in St. Petersburg on a government matter. I lived there for a week and although I had not one acquaintance there, I led an exceedingly gay life; I went quietly to the theatre every night and sat in the fourth balcony. I knew the names of all the actors and was passionately in love with the actress X., whom I saw one Sunday as Amalia in the drama *Misanthropy and Repentance*,³ a rôle which she played with great artistry. In the mornings, on returning from the General Staff, I usually stopped in a little sweet shop, to drink a cup of chocolate and read the literary journals. Once, as I was completely absorbed

³*Misanthropy and Repentance*, a melodrama by the German playwright August von Kotzebue (1761-1819). Kotzebue's plays were extremely popular in Russia in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The role of Amalia, a little girl, was a common study part for students of the theatrical schools.

by a critical article in the *Blagonamerenny*, somebody in a pea green uniform came to my table and quietly pulled from under my book a copy of the *Hamburg Gazette*. I was so engrossed in my reading that I did not even raise my eyes. The stranger ordered a beef-steak and took a seat opposite me. I continued reading without paying any attention to him. He finished his meal, angrily upbraided the little waiter for an inaccuracy in the bill, finished half a bottle of wine and left. Two young people were the only other customers in the sweet shop. "Do you know," one asked the other, "who this was? It was B., the author."⁴ "The author!" I exclaimed involuntarily and, leaving my journal unread and my cup half drunk, I sprang up to pay my bill and without waiting for my change, I rushed into the street. Glancing about me, I saw in the distance the pea green uniform and almost at a run, I hastened after it along the Nevsky Prospect. After a few steps I suddenly felt my way barred. I looked up. An officer of the guards had noticed me. He informed me that instead of pushing him off the sidewalk, I should have stopped and saluted. After this rebuke I became more careful, but to my misfortune I now encountered officers every minute and had to halt every time. In the meantime the distance between my author and me became greater and greater. Never before in my life had a soldier's uniform seemed so burdensome to me, never before had epaulettes appeared so enviable; finally I caught up with the pea green uniform on the Anichkin Bridge. "Permit me to inquire," I said raising my arm to my forehead in salute, "are you Mr. B., whose beautiful articles I had the happiness of reading in the *Emulator of Enlightenment*?" "I am not, sir," he replied, "I'm not an author but a lawyer; however, I know B. very well; only a quarter of an hour ago I met him near the Politseisky Bridge." In this fashion the high esteem in which I held Russian literature cost me 30 kopeks of change, a rebuke by the military and very nearly an arrest, and all in vain.

Despite all rational objections, the bold thought that I must become an author entered my mind ever more frequently. Finally, unable further to resist my natural yearning, I sewed myself a thick

⁴B., the author: Faddei Bulgarin (1789-1859). A writer and critic, notorious as an agent of the secret police. Bulgarin, who was the editor of the daily paper *The Northern Bee*, was a Polish deserter who had ingratiated himself with the secret police by giving evidence against Decembrist friends of his. During the reign of Nicholas I he acquired a reputation of a vile sycophant whom all honest men abhorred. Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, and Belinsky were his greatest enemies.

notebook, and firmly resolved to fill it with what ever might be. I analyzed and evaluated all types of poetry for the idea of humble prose had not yet entered my mind and I firmly decided on an epic poem drawn from our native history. It did not take me long to find a hero. I chose Rurik and embarked upon my labors.

I had achieved some practice in versification, while copying the little books which used to pass from hand to hand among our officers, to wit: *The Dangerous Neighbor*,⁵ *Criticism of the Moscow Boulevard*, *The Presnensk Ponds*, etc. Yet my poem made slow progress and I abandoned it after the third verse. I thought that the epic genre was not suited to me, and I began working on a tragedy about Rurik. The tragedy did not go well. I tried to turn it into a ballad, but even the ballad somehow did not come easily to me. Finally an inspiration flashed upon me: I began and successfully finished an epigraph for a portrait of Rurik.

Although my epigraph was not entirely unworthy of attention, particularly as the first work of a young poet, I sensed that I was not born a poet, and I remained content with this first attempt. But my creative endeavors had so bound me to literary pursuits that I could no longer part company with my notebook and inkstand. I now decided to stoop to prose. For a first attempt, not wishing to occupy myself with preparatory researches, such as the drawing up of the plan and the tightening of the various parts, etc., I decided to write down only separate ideas, without any connection and order, just as they would come to my mind. Unfortunately, no ideas came to my mind and in two whole days I thought of only the following remarks:

"A man who does not obey the laws of reason and who has become accustomed to follow the impulse of passion, frequently goes astray and subjects himself to late repentance."

This of course is a correct thought, but hardly a new one. I now forsook the field of ideas and set to work on short stories. But as I was unable, for want of habit, to organize the plots I had invented, I chose noteworthy anecdotes, which I had heard at one time or another from various people, and I attempted to color the truth by the liveliness of narrative, and sometimes even by the fruits of my own imagination. In composing these stories, I gradually developed my own style and learned to express myself correctly, agreeably, and freely. But soon my supply of ideas was exhausted, and I began to search again for a subject for my literary activities.

⁵"The Dangerous Neighbor": a light poem by V. L. Pushkin (1767-1830), a lesser uncle of a greater nephew.

The idea of abandoning trivial and dubious anecdotes in favor of a narrative of true and great events had long stirred my imagination. To be the judge, observer, and prophet of the ages and nations, seemed to me the highest goal attainable by a writer. But what kind of history could I write with my pitiful education? In what field would I not be surpassed by learned and conscientious men? What kind of history had not yet been exhausted by the scholars? Should I begin to write a world history? But is there not the immortal work of Abbé Milot? Should I turn to our native history? But what could I add to the words of Tatishchev, Boltin, and Golikov? Or should I delve into the Chronicles and struggle with the mysterious meaning of the archaic language when I feared I could not even master the old Slavic numerals? My thoughts turned to a history on a smaller scale, for instance a history of our district capital; but even here how many unsurmountable obstacles were there for me! Trips to the city, visits to the governor and the bishop, applications for admission to the archives and the monastic vaults. A history of our county town would be more convenient for me but it was of no interest to the philosopher, or the pragmatist. Moreover, it afforded little opportunity for eloquent presentation. N. had been raised to a township in the year of 17—, and the only interesting event described in its chronicles was a terrible fire which occurred ten years ago and which destroyed the market place and the courthouse.

An unexpected event solved my quandary. An old woman who was hanging laundry in the attic, came across an old basket filled with wood shavings, rubbish, and books. The whole house knew my passion for reading. I was sitting over my notebook, chewing my pen and thinking of trying my hand at rural sermons when my housekeeper triumphantly pulled the basket into my room, exclaiming joyfully "Books! Books!" "Books!" I echoed rapturously and threw myself at the basket. There it was—a whole pile of books in green and blue paper bindings. It was a collection of ancient calendars, a discovery which somewhat cooled my enthusiasm. Yet I was glad of the unexpected find. After all, these were books and I liberally rewarded the zeal of the washerwoman with fifty silver kopeks.

When I was alone I began to examine my calendars and soon they attracted my wholehearted attention. The calendars constituted an uninterrupted chain of years from 1744 to 1799, i.e., exactly fifty-five years. The blue pages, the kind that are usually found pasted

into calendars, were all covered with an old-fashioned handwriting. At one glance at these lines, I saw to my amazement that they comprised not only remarks about the weather and domestic accounts, but also short historical notes relating to the village of Goriukhino. I immediately devoted myself to an examination of these valuable papers and soon found that they represented a complete history of my patrimony during the course of almost an entire century, in the strictest chronological order. Over and above this they contained an inexhaustible treasure of economic, statistical, meteorological, and other scientific data. From then on I was entirely occupied with the study of these notes, for I perceived the possibility of extracting from them a well knit, interesting and educational narrative. Having familiarized myself sufficiently with these valuable documents, I began to look for other sources for a *History of the Village of Goriukhino*. Soon the abundance of such sources astonished me. Having devoted six whole months to preparatory research, I finally started on the long awaited task and, with God's aid, I completed it on the 3rd day of November of the year 1827.

Now, like another historian whose name I cannot remember,⁶ having carried out my difficult exploit, I lay down my pen and with sadness in my heart I retire into my garden to think of what I have accomplished. It seems to me also that, having written the *History of Goriukhino*, I am no longer needed by the world, that my duty is fulfilled and that it is time for me to rest.

The following is a list of the sources used in the writing of the *History of Goriukhino*:

1. A collection of ancient calendars in fifty-five parts. The first twenty parts of these are written in an old fashioned handwriting with headings. This chronicle was composed by my great grandfather Andrei Stepanovich Belkin and excels in clarity and brevity of style. For instance: "May 4, snow. Trishka beaten for rudeness. May 6, the brown cow died. Senka beaten for drunkenness. May 8, clear weather. May 9, rain and snow. Trishka beaten because of the weather. May 11, clear weather. New snow. Caught three hares," and so on without any analytical remarks: . . . The remaining thirty-five parts are written in various handwritings, the majority of them in the so called "shopkeeper style" with and without headings, in general prolific, disjointed and without observation of

⁶"Like another historian. . .". Edward Gibbon, the author of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

orthography. In some places one can observe a female hand. To this section belong the entries of my grandfather Ivan Andreevich Belkin and my grandmother, his spouse, Eupraksiya Alexeevna Belkin, as well as the notes of the bailiff Gorbovitsky.

2. The chronicle of the sub-deacon of Goriukhino. I discovered this interesting manuscript in the possession of my priest who was married to the chronicler's daughter. The first pages had been torn out and had been used by the children of the priest in the construction of so-called flyers. One of these fell into my courtyard. I lifted it up and was just about to return it to the children when I noticed that it was covered with writing. From the very first lines I could see that the flyer was made from a page of the chronicle and fortunately I succeeded in saving the rest of it. This chronicle, which I acquired for a quarter measure of oats, is distinguished by depth of thought and unusual eloquence.

3. Oral accounts. I did not disdain any source of information. I am particularly obliged to Agrafenya Trifunova, the mother of the steward Avdei, who was (it is said) the mistress of the bailiff Gorbovitsky.

4. The accounts of the census, with the notations of the previous stewards (account books and expense books) concerning the moral and general condition of the peasants.

The country named after its capital Goriukhino, extends over more than 240 desyatinas of the earth's surface. The number of inhabitants reaches sixty. In the north it borders on the villages of Deriukhov and Perkukhov, the inhabitants of which are poor, gaunt, and of small growth, and the proud owners of which are devoted to the martial practice of the hare hunt; in the south, the River Sivka divides Goriukhino from the country of the free husbandry men of Karachev—restless neighbors, known for the violent cruelty of their disposition, while in the west this country is bordered by the fertile fields of Zakharinsk, flourishing under the rule of wise and enlightened landowners. To the east Goriukhino touches on wild and uninhabited areas, on an impenetrable swamp where only the cranberry grows and only the monotonous croaking of frogs is heard, and where the superstitious tradition suggests the habitat of some sort of demon.

N.B. this swamp is therefore called Demon Swamp. It is said that once a half-witted swineherd girl was driving her pigs not far from this lonely place. She became pregnant and could not satisfac-

torily explain this occurrence. The voice of the people accused the swamp demon. But this tale does not merit the historian's attention and according to Niebuhr it is unworthy of belief.

From time immemorial Goriukhino has been famous for its fertility and healthy climate. On its rich fields grow rye, oats, barley, and buckwheat. A birch grove and a pine forest supply the inhabitants with timber and wood for the construction and heating of their abodes. There is no shortage of nuts, cranberries, huckleberries and bilberries. Mushrooms grow in unusually large numbers; fried in cream they represent a tasty, though unhealthy, nutriment. The pond is filled with carps, and pike and eels abound in the River Sivka.

The inhabitants of Goriukhino are generally of middle size and of strong and manly physique. Their eyes are gray and their hair is blond or red. The women are distinguished by their corpulence, by their noses which are somewhat raised, and by prominent cheekbones. N.B. The expression "hardy wench" is frequently met with in the notes of the steward on the pages of the census report. The men are orderly, industrious (particularly when they are tilling their own field), brave and bellicose: many of them go bear-hunting alone and they are renowned in the vicinity as fist fighters; in general they incline to the sensuous delights of inebriation. The women, in addition to carrying out the chores of their housework, share a great part of the men's labors, nor do they yield to the latter in acts of bravery. It is a rarity for one of them to be afraid of the steward. They make up a powerful communal guard, indefatigably keeping watch on the master's yard, and are called *spear women* (from the Slavic word *spear*). The principal task of the spear women is to beat a stone on an iron plate as frequently as possible and thus to frighten away any potential malefactors. They are as chaste as they are beautiful and any audacious attack upon their virtue is answered by them in rough and expressive fashion.

The natives of Goriukhino have since time immemorial carried on a fruitful trade in bast, bast baskets, and bast shoes. This trade is facilitated by use of the River Sivka. In spring the natives ferry across it in little boats like the ancient Scandinavians, while during the rest of the year they ford it, having first rolled their trousers up to their knees.

The Goriukhinian language is decidedly a branch of Slavic, but

it is as different from Slavic as is Russian. It is replete with ellipses and truncations. Some letters have been entirely dropped or replaced by others. However, a Russian can easily understand a Goriukhinian and vice versa.

The men were usually married at the age of 13 to maidens of 20. The wives beat their husbands during the first four or five years, after which the husbands, in turn, began to beat their wives; and in this fashion both sexes had their period of power, and the equilibrium was maintained.

Burial rites were observed in the following manner: on the very day of death the deceased was carried to the graveyard so that the corpse would not occupy unnecessary space in the hut. For this reason it sometimes happened that, to the indescribable joy of the relatives, the corpse would sneeze or yawn at the very minute when he was being carried in the coffin to the village boundaries. The wives would weep over their husbands, wailing and chanting: "My light, my audacious little head! For whom have you forsaken me? By what shall I remember you?" After the return from the graveyard there would begin a wake in honor of the deceased and the relatives and friends would usually remain drunk for two or three days or even sometimes for a whole week, depending on their zeal and the degree of their attachment to the memory of the deceased. These ancient ceremonies have been retained even to this day.

The attire of the Goriukhinians consisted of a shirt, worn over the trousers, a distinguishing token of their Slavic origin. In winter a skin coat was worn, but more for beauty than for real warmth, for the coat was usually thrown over one shoulder and dropped at the smallest labor which demanded movement.

The sciences, the arts, and poetry have flourished from time immemorial in Goriukhino. In addition to the priest and the minor church officials there were always people in Goriukhino who were able to read and write. The chronicles mention the *Zemstvo* official Terenti, who lived around the year 1767, who could write not only with his right but also with his left hand. This extraordinary man became renowned in the neighborhood because of his compositions of all kinds, letters, petitions, civilian passports, etc. Having frequently suffered for his art, for his helpfulness and his participation in various unusual events, he died at a ripe old age just after he had taught himself to write with his right foot, for the handwriting of both his hands had already become far too well known. He played,

as the reader will see below, an important rôle in the history of Goriukhino.

Music always has been a favorite art among the Goriukhinians. The balalaika and the bagpipes, giving delight to sensitive hearts, can be heard to this very day in Goriukhinian abodes and in the ancient communal building which is decorated with pine branches and with the emblem of the double-headed eagle.⁷

Poetry once flourished in ancient Goriukhino. To this very day the poems of Arkhip the Bald-Pate have been preserved in the memory of the descendants. In tenderness these poems do not yield to the eclogues of the famous Virgil, and in beauty of imagination they surpass by far the idylls of Mr. Sumarokov. Although in elegance of style they are somewhat inferior to the most modern works of our muses, they equal them in inventiveness and sharp wit.

We shall cite as an example the following satirical poem:

To the lordly manor house
Boldly steward Anton walks, (2)
In his shirt, accounts he holds, (2)
To deliver to the lord,
And the master looks at Anton,
Unsuspecting master.
Oh, Anton, steward, Anton!
From the masters you have stolen,
You have made the village poor
But your wife, she sits in clover.

Having thus acquainted my readers with the ethnographic, and statistical data concerning Goriukhino as well as with the character and customs of her inhabitants, let us now begin with the narrative itself.

THE LEGENDARY PERIOD

THE ELDER TRIFON

The manner of administration in Goriukhino changed repeatedly. Authority alternatively rested in the hands of the elders, elected by the village council, in the hands of the bailiffs, appointed by the landowners, and finally directly in the hands of the landowners themselves. I shall enlarge on the relative advantages and disadvantages of these various manners of government during the course of my account.

The origin of Goriukhino and of its early inhabitants are enveloped

⁷The government liquor shop.

in the vapors of obscurity. Obscure traditions tell us that at some time Goriukhino was a rich and large village, that all its inhabitants were prosperous, that the quit-rent was collected once a year and was sent, no one knows to whom, in several cart loads. In those days everyone bought cheaply and sold dearly. Bailiffs did not exist, the steward offended no one, the natives worked little and lived in clover and the herdsmen guarded their flocks in shoes. We must not be misled, however, by this idyllic picture. The idea of a Golden Age is common to all nations and proves only that men are never satisfied with the present and, since experience has taught them to place no stock in the future, they embellish the irretrievable past with all the colors of their imagination. Let us limit ourselves to authenticated facts:

From time immemorial the village of Goriukhino belonged to the famous house of the Belkins, but my forefathers, who owned many other patrimonies, paid no attention to this far distant land. Goriukhino paid a small tax and was governed by a council of elders, elected by the people in the *veche*⁸ which was called the village assembly.

But in the course of time the holdings of the Belkin family fell apart and began to decline. The impoverished heirs of the rich grandfather could not discard their habits of luxury and demanded full revenue from an estate which had decreased ten times. Cruel orders followed one after the other. The elder would read them at the *veche*, the village dignitaries would harangue, the village assembly would become alarmed; but the owners would receive not their double quit-rent, but only crafty and lame excuses and humble complaints written on greasy papers each provided with a half kopek tax stamp.

A dark cloud hung over Goriukhino, but nobody gave it any thought. During the final year of the reign of Trifon, the last elder elected by the people, on the very day of a church festival when the entire population noisily surrounded the diversion building (called "dive" in popular speech) or wandered aimlessly through the streets embracing each other while loudly singing the songs of Arkhip the Bald-Pate, a covered wicker carriage drove into the village, pulled by two venerable nags, hardly able to stand on their legs. A ragged looking Jewish driver sat on the box. From inside the carriage a head in a cap peered out and, so it seemed, looked with curiosity at the celebrating populace. The inhabitants met the carriage with

⁸A meeting of citizens in ancient Russia for discussion of state and communal matters.

derision and coarse jokes. (N.B. rolling up the fringes of their clothes the wiseacres jeered at the Jewish driver and exclaimed scoffingly: "Jew, Jew you eat pigs ears! . . ." *Chronicle of the Sub-Deacon of Goriukhino*.) But how amazed were they when the carriage stopped in the middle of the village and when the stranger, after jumping out of the carriage, called peremptorily for Trifon, the elder. This village dignitary was at that time in the House of Diversion, whence two villagers brought him, deferentially supporting him under the arms. For a moment the stranger looked menacingly at him and then gave him a letter ordering him to read it immediately. According to custom the Goriukhinian elders never read anything themselves. The elder was illiterate. The *zemstvo* official Avdei was sent for. He was found not far away, sleeping in an alley under a fence, and was awakened and led to the stranger. But be it from sudden fright or from a mournful premonition, the letter which was written in a very clear hand, seemed to become foggy before his eyes and he was incapable of making it out. The stranger, cursing menacingly, sent the elder Trifon and the *zemstvo* official Avdei to sleep off their drunkenness. Thus the reading of the letter was delayed until the next morning and the stranger went to the bailiff's quarters, whither the Jew carried the little suitcase.

The Goriukhinians looked in silent amazement at these unusual happenings, but soon the carriage, the Jew, and the stranger were forgotten. The day ended noisily and gaily and the Goriukhinians went to sleep without foreboding of what was in store for them.

At sunrise the citizens were awakened by knocks at their windows and summoned to the village assembly. One after the other the citizens appeared in the courtyard of the bailiff's hut which served as the *veche* meeting place. Their eyes were dull and red, their faces swollen. Yawning and scratching themselves they looked at the man in the cap who, dressed in an old blue kaftan, stood solemnly on the porch. They tried to recall the features of this man whom they felt that they had seen somewhere before. Trifon the elder and the *zemstvo* official Avdei stood near, bareheaded, in an attitude of servility and deep gloom. "Is everybody here?" the stranger asked. "Is everyone here?" repeated the elder. "Everyone," the citizens replied. Thereupon the elder announced that a letter had been received from the master. He ordered the *zemstvo* official to read it loudly so the assembly could hear it. Avdei stepped forward and in a loud voice read the following. (N.B. I copied this fearful letter from the original owned by Trifon the elder. He had kept it in the Icon

case with other documents of his reign over Goriukhino. I could not obtain the original letter myself.)

Trifon Ivanov!

The bearer of this letter, my emissary B., is coming to my patrimony, the village of Goriukhino, in order to take over its administration. Immediately after his arrival you are to call together the peasants and announce to them my lordly will, to wit: the orders of my representative B. are to be obeyed by the peasants as if these commands were my own. And whatever demands are made are to be fulfilled without contradiction. My representative B. is ordered to treat disobedience with the utmost severity. I have been forced to this action by the disgraceful disobedience of the inhabitants of Goriukhino and by your own knavish conniving.

Signed: NN.

Then B., crossing his legs so that they looked as though they formed the letter X and putting his arms akimbo so that he resembled a Greek letter Phi gave the following short but expressive speech: "Look out and do not try to be too clever with me. You are, I know, a coddled people, but I will beat all this nonsense out of your heads, probably faster than you got over yesterday's drunkenness." But nobody was drunk any longer. The Goriukhinians, as if struck by thunder, hung their heads and in terror went each to his own hut.

THE RULE OF THE BAILIFF B.

B. took over the reins of government and set about the promulgation of his political system, a system which deserves special scrutiny.

The foundation of this system was based on the following axiom: The richer the peasant the more spoiled he is; the poorer the peasant the more tractable he is. Thus, B. exerted himself to achieve the utmost tractability, as if this were the main peasant virtue. He demanded an inventory of the peasants and divided them into rich and poor. 1. Arrears were divided among the rich peasants and exacted from them with the utmost severity. 2. Idlers and those who were found wanting were immediately put into field work and if, according to B.'s accounts, their labor proved insufficient, he turned them over to other peasants as day laborers, for which the latter paid B. a voluntary tax. The peasants thus turned over into bondage had the full right to buy themselves off—paying a twofold annual quit-rent over and above their arrears. All kinds of com-

munal duties fell to the rich peasants. It was however, in the field of army recruiting that the triumph of this greedy ruler could be found; for one after the other, all rich peasants bought themselves off until finally the lot fell on a good for nothing ruined peasant.⁹ The village gatherings were abolished. The quit-rent was collected all year round, in small installments. Over and above this numerous incidental levies were introduced. It seems the peasants did not really pay much more than they used to, but somehow they could never amass sufficient money for these levies. In three years Goriukhino became completely impoverished.

Goriukhino became increasingly gloomy. Grass grew in the market place. The songs of Arkhip the Bald-Pate resounded no longer. One half of the peasants remained working in the fields, and the other half served as day laborers; the peasant children set out wandering over the wide world on their own and the day of the church festival became, so the chronicler tells us, no longer a day of joy and triumph, but an anniversary of gloom which only recalled sad memories.

⁹*Author's Footnote:* The sinful bailiff put Anton Timofeev into irons, but his father bought him off for 100 rubles; the bailiff also put Petrushka Ereemeev into irons, but he was also bought off by his father for 68 rubles. The evil one wanted to put Lekha Tarasov into irons, but the latter ran away into the forest. The bailiff grieved much about this and pronounced many raging speeches. He also took Vanya the drunkard into town and put him in the army. (From information obtained from the Goriukhinian peasants.)

Americans in the Crimean War

BY EUFROSINA DVOICHENKO-MARKOV

*Russia is not the barbarous nation which her late
adversaries have represented her to be.*

—THOMAS SEYMOUR to Secretary Marcy, 1856

LONG before the Crimean War, when discussing the possibility of a future conflict between Russia and England, both the Russians and the Americans considered their countries as potential allies.¹ It was, therefore, natural that during the Crimean War the traditional friendship of Russia and the United States was greatly strengthened. The two countries had supported one another usually for reasons of self-interest. During the Crimean War, the Anglo-French alliance was directed not only against Russia, but also against the United States. At the beginning of the struggle, Palmerston formulated his program of partitioning the Russian Empire,² and Lord Clarendon, in his speech at the opening of Parliament, made it clear that England and France were also united in their efforts to thwart American expansion.

Preservation of the integrity of the United States was an imperative necessity for Russia. She wanted the United States to be a strong power, so that in case of war the United States would be helpful to her.³ Thomas Seymour of Connecticut, appointed Minister to Russia, arrived in St. Petersburg in March, 1854, and reported to Secretary of State Marcy that the Russian government had an "ardent desire for the friendship of the U. S. and for drawing

¹As early as 1832, the Russian Foreign Office wrote to the Russian envoy to the United States, Krudener, that in case of war between Russia and England, the United States would necessarily become "nos alliés obligées," and, in 1836, Secretary Forsyth assured Krudener that in case of war with England, Russia might count on the United States. (See F. Golder, *Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives*, 1917, vol. I, pp. 58 and 62.)

²The British plans of dismembering Russia were as follows: Finland was to be restored to Sweden, the Baltic provinces were to be turned over to Prussia, Poland was to be re-established as a buffer state between Germany and Russia, Wallachia and Moldavia were to be given to Austria, Crimea, Circassia, and Georgia were to be ceded to Turkey. (See *Letters of Palmerston* . . . , London, 1927, pp. 360-361.)

³Golder, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

still closer the bonds of political and commercial intercourse."⁴ Although the United States preserved strict neutrality during the Crimean War, Seymour soon realized that he had become an active supporter of Russia in her crisis, as had his predecessor, John Quincy Adams, during the Napoleonic invasion.⁵ Seymour compared the Russian situation in the Crimean War with that of the year 1812. He wrote to Marcy: ". . . the Russians are quite as ready to make sacrifices of every kind for the defense of their country, as in the days of the French invasion. . ." He had, he continued, "no idea that there is any class of men among them who would be willing to give up Sebastopol and the Crimea, any more than we should be willing to give up California, in the event of any future war which might occur to us."

Although the neutrality of the United States permitted the employment of American vessels to convey munitions and troops of the Anglo-French coalition to the Crimea, Seymour protested and wrote to Marcy:

The principles of our government forbid interference of any kind in the struggle which is going on. But if it would be right to show the slightest leaning towards one side. . . . I see nothing to convince me that we should not give our preference to the masters of the Baltic and the Euxine.

It is interesting to note the personal admiration of Seymour for the Russian Emperor, Nicholas I, who was considered at that time the most despotic ruler in Europe. The American envoy found the Russian monarch "perfectly irresistible," likened his handshake to "a good republican grasp" and assured Marcy that "after all the Autocrat of Russia had been much misrepresented" to the world by his enemies. The admiration of Seymour for Nicholas I was shared by other American diplomats of the time and even by the American press.⁶

Here it is necessary to mention the young attaché of the American Legation at St. Petersburg, Andrew White, who later became founder and President of Cornell University and, in 1892, Minister to Russia. He wrote in his *Autobiography* that Nicholas I "was generally considered the most perfect specimen of a human being, physically speaking, in all Europe . . . the most majestic being ever created.

⁴National Archives, Washington, D. C.

⁵*Selected Writings of J. Q. Adams*, New York, 1946, pp. 282-284.

⁶See *Diary of G. M. Dallas*, U.S. Minister to Russia 1837-1839, Philadelphia, 1892, and *The U.S. Review*, 1855, vol. 4, p. 396.

Colossal in stature, with a face such as one finds on a Greek coin, but overcast with a shadow of Muscovite melancholy . . . he bore himself like a god."⁷

The American colony in Russia at the beginning of the Crimean War was small. In May, 1854, Seymour wrote to Marcy: "There are several Americans here, who receive much attention from the government offices and the citizens." Among them, the famous Colonel Samuel Colt of Hartford, inventor of the revolver which bears his name, came to offer his improved arms to the Russian officials. Dickerson, an expert in mechanical matters, came with Colt. The young White conducted them through the Museum of the Hermitage. Among the relics of Peter the Great, Dickerson discovered machines which had only recently been reinvented in Europe and were worth a fortune. As White said, "These machines had stood there open to everybody, since two hundred years before, and no human being had apparently ever taken the trouble to find the value of them."⁸

In September, 1855, Seymour reported to the Secretary of State the arrival in St. Petersburg of about fifteen American mechanics who were to work at the several workshops of the Moscow railroad. "If it should be decided to build more railways," wrote Seymour, "there is scarcely a doubt that Americans will be wanted to engage in these undertakings." A private company under the direction of Nicholas Perozio was formed to supply the Russian government with rails. Perozio said that he wished to employ Americans and only Americans in these works. Rails were manufactured in southern Russia on the river Donets, in the province of Ekaterinoslav, and Perozio made this statement in order to attract the attention of American mechanics, who understood "how to smelt iron by anthracite coal." Perozio also wanted to know the price of machines in America, so as to order them there if necessary.⁹

Seymour also reported to Marcy about Grand Duke Constantin's plans for building up the Russian fleet. Describing the Grand Duke as a man of a practical turn of mind, Seymour added that "he approaches nearer to the American character than any public man I have met since I came to Europe," and that "in order to carry out

⁷A. White, *Autiography*, New York, 1905, vol. I, pp. 451 and 470.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 454-455.

⁹Original letters in the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

his plans, it is his purpose to draw to some extent on American genius and enterprise."¹⁰

In February, 1856, Seymour forwarded to Marcy some interesting documents relating to a project for improving the navigation of the lower part of the river Dnieper by steam. The founders of the company formed to promote steam navigation on the Dnieper offered to the Americans the construction of several steam-tugs and steamers for that river. We don't know the result of this Russian offer, but evidence that a steamboat was ordered in New York by the Russian government during the Crimean War was found in the Russian Archives by Dr. F. Golder, who wrote:

When the boat was completed and named *America*, it hoisted the Stars and Stripes and sailed for the Pacific by way of Cape Horn. On the way it put in at Rio de Janeiro and while there, an English warship threatened to seize it as a Russian vessel and would probably have done so, had not the American naval officer come to the rescue.¹¹

We find additional details about the S.S. *America* in other sources. The boat was ordered by the Russian government for the river Amur in Siberia and arrived safely at the mouth of that river in 1856.¹² The commander of the *America* was Captain Hudson from the American frigate *Niagara*. In 1857, Seymour reported to Secretary Marcy the arrival of Captain Hudson in St. Petersburg, from Amur, by way of Irkubsk. A year later, a young Lieutenant of the Russian Navy, the aide-de-camp of Grand Duke Constantin, Baron Boyé, was sent by the Russian government to the United States to witness the laying of the electric cable between America and Europe, from the American frigate *Niagara*. Seymour gave him a letter of introduction to Captain Hudson and expressed the hope that he would be cordially received by the President.¹³

At the same time an expedition by the Boston Submarine and Wrecking Company came to Sebastopol with machinery on board

¹⁰The American sympathies of Grand Duke Constantin were mentioned in such a literary monument of the Crimean War as Lev Tolstoy's *Tales of Sebastopol*. During the siege of Sebastopol a hope was expressed by one of the Russian soldiers that the brother of the Tsar, the Grand Duke Constantin, would come with the American fleet to help the besieged.

¹¹F. Golder, "Russian-American Relations during the Crimean War," *American Historical Review*, XXXI (1926), p. 474. The article is based on material found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office in 1917.

¹²T. Barsukov, *Graf N. N. Mouraviev-Amursky*, Moscow, 1891, vol. 1, p. 478.

¹³National Archives, Washington, D. C.

to raise the sunken Russian fleet. The American Consul in Odessa reported to Secretary Marcy that another Boston company had sent to Sebastopol its agent and Chief Engineer, J. E. Gowen, and that "it does not seem now quite certain whether both parties can work there at the same time."¹⁴

The U. S. Consul in Odessa, S. Ralli, a Russian citizen of Greek origin, was of much service to the Americans who came to Odessa and Sebastopol during the Crimean War, especially to American doctors. About thirty American surgeons and physicians obtained positions on the medical staff of the Russian Army between the opening of the war and the year of peace. Twenty of them were medical students in Paris, who had set out from there to join the Russian medical corps.

Almost half of the American doctors in Russia during the Crimean War fell victim to such diseases as typhus fever, cholera, and small-pox, diseases which swept away more human lives than were lost on the battle field. Doctors and nurses on the medical staff of the Russian Army were especially exposed to epidemic diseases. One of the American physicians, Dr. Courtney King of South Carolina, describing the epidemic of typhus in the Crimea, wrote to Ralli, in February, 1855: "My friends and myself, I am happy to say, have escaped it up to this time, and with three or four more Russian physicians are the only ones."¹⁵ Two months later, Ralli reported to Seymour the death of Dr. King of malignant typhus fever, and Seymour wrote to Secretary Marcy:

I have just received the painful intelligence of the death of Dr. King, one of the young American surgeons in the Russian service. He was much beloved by all who knew him, and the news of his decease will be a severe blow to his relations and friends in Charleston. . . . On the occasion of his burial, the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church, inspired by truly Christian feelings attended the funeral of the deceased in a body.

Seymour enclosed with his dispatch a letter to the bereaved family of Dr. King, with all the information he could procure concerning the sickness and death of this highly promising physician, and a note from Count Nesselrode containing "a recognition of the valuable service of Dr. King, together with an expression of the sympathy of the Imperial Government with the family of the lamented deceased."

Two American doctors, Draper of Massachusetts and Turnipseed,

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Original letters in National Archives, Washington, D. C.

who were sent in the summer of 1854 directly to Sebastopol, reported to Ralli and Seymour the latest news concerning military operations in the Crimea. Dr. Draper wrote:

Since the 26th December, the position of Dr. Turnipseed and myself has undergone a material change. Two days subsequently we passed from the north side of the road, to be located in the city of Sebastopol itself, by virtue of a special request to that effect, made by General Osten-Saken. Quarters were assigned us in the house occupied by himself, and I am happy to say that from the General we receive every kindness and from his gentlemanly aids every attention to our comfort, which we could possibly desire. Our professional occupation is at the place where the wounded are first brought from the 4th, 5th, and 6th bastions, the building appropriated for this purpose being the "Hall of the Noblesse," which in its taste and beauty is an ornament and credit to the city. . . . The progress of events at Sebastopol was at first looked for from day to day, afterwards from week to week. Now, month by month should be the gauge of measurement of progress and results.

Dr. Turnipseed wrote in April, 1855:

The Allies bombarded the bastions as well as the city with redoubled energy for eight days commencing the day after *le jour de Pâques*, but I believe did little damage to the bastions. . . . The numbers of killed and wounded each day was about 600 on the Russian side. There have been quite a quantity of bombs thrown into the city itself. . . . I was expecting nothing better than that the house in which I have apartments would receive some of their unwelcomed visits.¹⁶

No less interesting and important was the report about the Crimean War made to the U. S. government by a special American military commission sent to Europe in 1855 to study the European military systems and observe the war-like operations. The American officers selected for this trust were: Major Delafield of the Engineers, Major Mordecai of Ordnance, and Captain McClellan of Cavalry.¹⁷ McClellan was the youngest of the three and was selected on account of the brilliant military qualities he had displayed in the Mexican war. He spoke the principal languages of Europe and his report, being most excellent, was used for the text-books on the art of war at the American Military Academy. McClellan was to observe particularly the engineers and cavalry, as well as to make a special study of the Russian Army at large. The commission first visited

¹⁶The communications of American doctors from Crimea about the principal events and exploits certainly deserve to be published in a special work, being an interesting contribution to the history of the Crimean War.

¹⁷Later General George B. McClellan of Civil War fame.

England, then France. In May, 1855, they left Paris, intending to visit the Russian camp in the Crimea, by way of Warsaw and Kiev. In Warsaw, however, they learned that no person, not even the veteran hero Paskevich, who treated them with much courtesy, had the power to grant them permission to go from Warsaw direct to Crimea. They decided, therefore, to proceed first to St. Petersburg.

There is a very interesting description of the trip from Warsaw to St. Petersburg in the private letters of Captain McClellan. He wrote to his brother:

The road from Warsaw here is truly a magnificent one. . . . So great is the traffic upon it that it is literally covered from one end to the other with trains of wagons passing in both directions. . . . So great is this now that it seems hardly possible that Russia can feel the effect of the blockade very sensibly.¹⁸

McClellan described also with enthusiasm the "most magnificent city" of St. Petersburg, which fully equaled his expectations. During their residence at St. Petersburg, the officers of the American commission were presented to the Emperor at his request, but could not succeed in obtaining his permission to go to Sebastopol, because the Russian officers in command there had requested that no strangers should be permitted to come to Sebastopol. In July the commission visited Moscow and examined whatever was of interest from a military point of view there. They left Russia in August and went to Crimea in October, through Germany, Trieste, Smyrna, and Constantinople, on the first English steamer that sailed for Balaklava. McClellan, therefore, was able to make a very complete study of the siege of Sebastopol, and the Russian siege technique observed there influenced later his actions in the American Civil War. In his book, *The Armies of Europe*, half of which is devoted to a description of the Russian Army, McClellan expressed his admiration for the skill and the energy of the Russian engineer, Totleben, whose "labors and their results," he wrote, "will be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument of the value of fortifications." He called the siege of Sebastopol "the most magnificent defense of fortifications that has ever yet occurred."¹⁹

As McClellan was a captain of cavalry, this arm of the military forces engaged his particular attention, and he gave, in his book, a detailed description of the Russian cavalry, especially of the Russian

¹⁸G. Hillard, *Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan*, Philadelphia, 1864, pp. 65-66.

¹⁹G. McClellan, *The Armies of Europe*, Philadelphia, 1861, pp. 24-25.

irregulars, the Cossacks. McClellan believed that this system should be imitated by the American Army in fighting against the Indians. It is interesting to note that the first time the military organization of the Russian Cossacks, especially their fortifications, was described and used in America against the Indians, was in the seventeenth century, by the founder of Virginia, John Smith.

Russian-American friendship during the Crimean War brought numerous advantages to both nations. One of the important practical results of this friendship was the help given by Russia to the United States in the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the United States and Persia. Requesting Russian support, Seymour wrote to Nesselrode:

There was a time, a few years ago, when we had nearly completed a treaty with the Shah of Persia, but before an exchange of ratifications could take place, the negotiations were suddenly broken off, and there was reason to believe English influence had been used to produce such a result.²⁰

In response to this request, the Russian Legation at Teheran was instructed by the Russian government not only to aid the negotiations but to extend its protection to the American citizens in Persia until the establishment there of a diplomatic representation of the United States.

Another important commercial advantage which came to America during the Crimean War was the establishment of American trading houses on the Amur River in Eastern Siberia and on Sakhalin Island.

As early as 1853, the Russian Minister to the United States, de Bodisco, wrote to St. Petersburg: "Americans say that this is the time for Russia to seize both banks of the Amur river and to open commerce with the United States."²¹ In May, 1856, an American Consul for Amur was appointed and sent to St. Petersburg, but he could not yet be officially recognized by the Russian government, because, at that time, the station at the mouth of the Amur was not considered a commercial port. However, with the help of Seymour and the protection of the great Russian Americanophile General Muraviev, Governor of Eastern Siberia, the American Consul, Perry

²⁰Seymour to Marcy, June, 1855. National Archives, Washington, D. C. It is interesting to note here that England also gained her first access to Persia in the sixteenth century with Russian support, when the Russian Tsar, Ivan the Terrible, gave English merchants the exclusive right of free transit by way of the Volga to Central Asia.

²¹F. Golder, *Guide to Materials* . . . , vol. 1, p. 75.

McD. Collins of California, and his companion, Peyton of Virginia, obtained a passport to proceed unofficially to the banks of the Amur river. They set out for Eastern Siberia in November, 1856, in company with General Muraviev.

In April, 1857, Seymour wrote to the Department of State:

I have the honor to enclose a communication to the Department from Mr. Collins. Mr. Peyton of Virginia, who accompanied Mr. Collins as far as Kiakhta, has returned to this city, and will set out for the U.S. in the course of eight or ten days. On reaching Washington, he will give you interesting particulars of his late journey and of the attentions which he received from General Mouravieff.

Although, for international reasons, no foreign consuls could, for the time being, be admitted on the Amur and on Sakhalin Island, the American merchants there were protected by secret orders of the Russian government.²² In 1860, there were already seven American trading houses established on the Amur river. It happened as Seymour predicted to Collins:

The quiet way in which you will go there and enter upon the discharge of the duties with which you can now occupy your mind, may, after all, be the best way to initiate a trade between Russia and America, which will be for the mutual advantage of the two countries.²³

²²F. Golder, "Russian-American Relations . . .", p. 475.

²³National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Ivan Bunin

1870-1953

BY JACQUES CROISÉ

*All through life I am living under the sign of death;
even so, I feel that I will never die.*

—IVAN BUNIN

IVAN BUNIN, "the last Russian classic," Nobel Prize winner for literature in 1933, died in Paris on November 8, 1953. Having written intensely about death for a long lifetime as philosopher, novelist, and poet, he has at last met it face to face and, like Ovid, in exile.

Bunin left Russia after the collapse of the White Armies, being then past fifty. He continued to write abroad, unaffected by the momentous events which had upset his life. The reason is that there have been few human beings as self-willed as this writer. He never belonged to any literary school; never had any disciples, and, in the midst of the unsettled and ever-changing world of the twentieth century, maintained an imperturbable attitude.

Such a long life presents some anachronisms. As a writer, Bunin was a contemporary of Tolstoy; in exile, of Vladimir Nabokov; and, as a poet, of Blok and Mayakovsky. But it is with Tolstoy alone (about whom he has written, we must remember, a remarkable book, *Tolstoy's Liberation*), that he had one thing in common, namely "artistic realism."

Ivan Bunin was born in Voronezh in the heart of central Russia, an area from which came so many of the great Russian writers. In *The Life of Arseniev*, a fine autobiography, in which the "ego" of the author became a subject for literary experimentation, Bunin explained the genesis of his art, just as in *Soukhodol (Dry Valley)* he explored the mysterious sources of his heredity.

Bunin was born into an old noble family, at a time when it was rapidly declining. This family had already given to Russian letters two nineteenth century poets, Anna Bunin and Zhukovsky. Ivan Bunin spent a childhood imbued with a sad and special poetry: "in the deep silence of the fields, in the midst of a nature extremely fertile in its soil, but poor in picturesqueness—, in summer among the

wheat that grew up to the doors, in winter among the great snow-drifts."

Creative curiosity, robust imagination, and complete inner integrity, marked Bunin from an early age for a writer's career. Everything interested him because of his desire to describe the world around him.

The Soviet Encyclopedia which could not brush aside the great Russian writer, devoted a long article to him emphasizing that the art of Bunin is the product of a "dying class." It is true that Bunin devoted many pages to the petty nobility in its decline, to men with a glorious past and an uncertain future, but he wrote on the common people his most effective pages of eternal truth. Man interested Bunin more than events, and the individuals he described are not of one period alone. His great novel, *The Village*, published in 1909, is one of the masterpieces of Russian literature, and no one interested in Russia can afford to ignore it.

After an education which never went very far, as though Bunin desired no other teacher for his art but life itself, it became necessary for him to support himself, first by working in a city hall office, later in a newspaper office. But his work affected him very little in comparison with what was happening inside—namely, the slow maturing of the writer.

In the Russia of that time, which was absorbed whole-heartedly in political and social questions, in ideas of "progress" and of "justice," divided into revolutionaries and reactionaries, this young writer was interested only in the eternally human. He walked the streets of an obscure town, with an intense desire to forget nothing of that which he experienced, observed, and heard.

What should he write about? Bunin insisted that one should write about roof tops, wooden-soled shoes, the backs of passers-by, not to "grapple with oppression and violence," or to defend the oppressed and the underdog, or "to create typical characters," or to dash off large pictures of contemporary social conditions, moods, and trends. Was it indifference toward life, or the building of an ivory tower? One of Bunin's best biographers, Cyril Zaitsev, does not think so. For Bunin had also said: "What does it mean to write? It is to experience life incessantly, and always with greater force striving to find in it that which gives joy, that is to say, love . . . and to suffer from all that prevents love and hurts it."

At twenty-five, Ivan Bunin resolutely began his writing career. He already had some publications to his credit and was fairly well

known at the time. Little by little he freed himself of various stylistic influences and began to develop his own individual style. It may be said that since Bunin, no one, except Vladimir Nabokov, whose reputation had grown in exile, had put such stress on words, on the musical possibilities inherent in the language. It is said that Tolstoy did not hesitate to change a sentence if it was too well turned, but Bunin believed that perfection detracts nothing from naturalness of style. That which, in the younger writer Nabokov, is cerebral virtuosity, and perhaps partly a desire to startle the reader, is in the old master a sort of necessity, both sensorial and sensuous.

The senses play a great part in Bunin's works, even in his metaphysics.

Smell: "On entering, one smells immediately the odor of apples, and then all the odors—of the old mahogany furniture, and of the lime blossoms which since June have been drying on the window sills."

Taste: "I identified myself with each country by its specialties, by all that the people ate and drank. . . Each meal was for me a joy."

Sight: "I imbued myself forever with the profound sense, the truly divine sense of colors, earthly and celestial. In adding up the balance of all that life has given to me, I see that this mauve-blue which filters through and pierces the branches and the leaves is of the utmost importance, and I shall remember it even on my death bed."

This feeling for nature was certainly very strong in many Russian writers. With the exception of Dostoevsky, who remained pre-eminently a writer of the city, all the well-known Russian writers gave an important place to nature in their works. But Bunin, as the philosopher Stepun has judiciously observed, unlike Tolstoy and Turgenev, never forgot to include man in nature, and thereby to humanize it. He managed to create perfect balance between man and the universe in which he lives.

The curious thing about it is that, although Bunin was Russian to the marrow of his bones, the universe was never foreign to him. Endowed with a prodigious memory which was the key to his creative power, Bunin, when he saw them for the first time, "recognized" the medieval castle of the West, or the sand-covered ruins of Baalbek. He was able to describe with the same understanding and the same love the dreary regions of his native land and the jungles of Colombo.

Love and women play an important part in Bunin's works. Woman is like the earth, full of unknown forces; she carries the eternal laws, like an amphora of love. This love has many facets; somber or radiant, it is never absent from Bunin's work. For love, a rickshaw boy dies in "Brethren"; in "The Great Road," Parasha becomes insane because of it; Elaghin kills the beautiful Polish actress whose love was a joy and torment for him in "The Elaghin Affair"; the charming Nathalie dies just when her love finds fulfillment in "Nathalie"; and because love does not satisfy her, the beautiful girl of "The Serpant of Fire" becomes a nun. And if the end of "The Gentleman from San Francisco" is tragic it is because the protagonist spent his life being a business man without having the time to love either women or the world. Love is also memory; the soul is aware of its destiny. That which we have imagined, which we have dreamed about, which we have waited for, is but the memory of what we once knew. But memory is purer than reality. From disharmony, man seeks to escape into death. Bunin's most beautiful pages on love lead to death.

The key to Bunin's entire work is death. It is because of the reality of death that life is worth something. Without death, life would be boundless and incomplete. Death is the continuation of life, its justification, its release into the absolute. Unlike Tolstoy, whose religiosity was intellectual, Bunin, in spite of his own scepticism, had the gift of mysticism and metaphysics. "I knew for sure," he wrote, "that there exists something more ancient, even in comparison to the farthest terrestrial antiquity." That which is older than the oldest terrestrial antiquity, is death. With what "eagerness," so to speak, did Bunin study man's death. Death is the last examination that man takes, the only one where cheating is impossible, and where the judgement is final.

The old Russian peasant woman in "Veselyi dvor" comes back to die in the house of her son and does not find him there. "She made the sign of the cross, raising her hand with difficulty, kissed the ikon and put it on the little table, thought for a moment, remembered that she was dying and crossed herself once more, attempting to express by a sigh, and especially by slow, serious gestures of her hand, her complete submission to God, her complete adoration before His glory and His power, her hopes in His mercy."

The rickshaw man dies, worn out by running errands for his white brethren. "And the old rickshaw man, who for a long time had longed eagerly for the end of his sufferings, lay down in the stifling

darkness of his shanty, under the roof of dry leaves rustling with small red snakes. He died in the evening from freezing cramps and diarrhea. The life of the rikshaw man was snuffed out with the sun which disappeared behind extensive mauve sheets of water stretching toward the West, in the purple of its ashes, and in the gold of the most beautiful clouds in the world. Night came, and in the forest near Colombo, there remained only a tiny shriveled corpse which had lost its number, its name, as the river Kalemi loses its name when it flows into the ocean. When the sun sets it becomes wind, but what becomes of a dead man?"

This simplicity in confronting death is the attribute of primitive beings. Other people, the civilized ones, through their terror of it, either run away from it—there are many murders and suicides among Bunin's characters—or are ignorant of it until the end, dying "despite themselves," missing therefore the most solemn human experience. This is true in the case of "The Gentleman from San Francisco."

It would be useless to look for a moral or logical synthesis in Bunin's work. Here we cannot agree with Zaitsev who speaks of one in his biography of the writer. If Bunin is a moralist, it is only because he does not know anything about falsehood, because no preconceived idea impels him to substitute, as did Tolstoy, his own truth for the truth of reality. . . . He does not construct a system, but leaves us free to recognize upon the tapestry that he presents the pattern of our own natural tendencies.

Bunin did not distinguish between the mystical disciplines and Oriental religions which inspired him to write beautiful pages. He comprehends God not through his will to understand Him, not through his intellect, but by being aware of His presence. "I live as a hermit, working from morning until evening. But I work easily, with that rare clarity of spiritual insight which brings incomparable happiness."

"To you my soul, the Lord has entrusted talent. Accept the gift with terror." He is in a way too intelligent to believe himself responsible for his gifts as a writer, therefore he is grateful to Him from whom they are derived.

In brief, the world for Bunin would not have been complete if he had not had someone to whom he could give praise. In the poetry of Bunin there is the gravity of the Psalms, and there is throughout his work the desire for an immense and coherent universe. He is against destruction. The Russian Revolution was abhorrent to him

because it began with the destruction of all that which had been acquired by long generations of men.

"I passed the crowd composed of women, youths, and crippled old people, whose eyes were pale from time and the wind from the steppes, and I thought continually of old times, and of the strange power of the past. Where does this power come from? And what is its significance? Therein, perhaps, is hidden one of the greatest mysteries of life. And why does it rule man with such a miraculous power? In our religious feeling, in our homage to the past—of which we are not conscious sometimes—the relationship of our thoughts and actions with men who are no more, plays an immense part. . . ." ("On the Donetz").

It is always memory, a pre-existential and prenatal memory, without which life would be nothing but a succession of insignificant and absurd facts, which is the center of Bunin's work. "The apex of each human life is the memory that remains of it. Is not this desire that we have to be remembered, our desire to react against death?" asks the author. For him there was no question. Memory is the prime evidence of immortality and because of this, literature is not a vain occupation, but one of the functions of life.

Book Reviews

POSSONY, STEFAN T. *A Century of Conflict; Communist Techniques of World Revolution*. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953. 433 pp. \$7.50.

This well documented book presents the history of expansion of the Communist dominion and a penetrating analysis of Communist strategy and tactics. Communists have twisted the famous statement of Clausewitz into: "Peace is the continuation of war by other means." For them, the political war never stops. The author is right when he says that Communists always think in the terms of strategy and tactics. He has reconstructed the Communist quasi-military pattern of conquest from their own writings and deeds. But is there only one pattern of Communist conquest or are there many, each of them adjusted to the requirements of a particular situation but all of them having some basic features in common? The historical part of the book validates the second assumption. Communists are dangerous not only because they have conceived of a total strategy applied to that never ceasing conflict which involves every aspect of social life of its protagonists, but also because they have proved time and again their aptitude for adjusting tactics to various situations. The pattern of the Bolshevik action during the Russian Civil War was brilliantly modified by Mao in the Chinese Civil War; the assault on the Catholic Church in Poland follows a different time-table from that which was applied to Hungary.

The Communist record of successes between 1917 and 1953 is

imposing, but it is difficult to agree with the author when he says in the preface: "the successful encroachment on the free world is due largely to the operational know-how of the Communists." This know-how was one of the several causes of the Communist successes, but it has yielded results only in very favorable circumstances. Some of the basic assumptions of the Communist strategy have not been borne out by facts, for instance, the assumption that war produces revolutions. Military defeat contributed greatly to the Bolshevik success in Russia, but did not transfer power to Communists in Germany (either after 1918 or 1945), in Japan, or Italy. Moreover, Communist planners frequently took their own wishful thinking for a knowledge of foreign situations. They misread completely the possibilities of a Communist revolution in Poland in 1920, in Germany in the early twenties, or in France and Italy after the last war. They won victories when favored by other factors than just their know-how. One of those factors was at times the lack of foresight of their actual or potential adversaries (political wisdom in international affairs is often nothing but the total sum of errors made by the enemies). For instance, was it because of Stalin's foresight that the Western Allies acted in 1943-1945 as though the military victory was the only aim of a war; they visibly forgot the truism that military victory is only a means of achieving a political situation favorable to the victors. Stalin was simply intelligent enough to capitalize on Western

errors and on the conquests made by his armies. The book provides many illustrations which are also known from other sources.

At other times, the prospective victims of Communist conquest were lacking in will power, were demoralized (not necessarily only by Communist tactics), disunited and frequently plain stupid. The two Revolutions in Russia and China provide sad examples. The author's version of those events proves the point.

The Communist conquest of Eastern Europe did not require unusually clever planning, because it was accompanied by military occupation by the overwhelming force of a Great Power. The anti-Communists were powerless, while the Soviet armed forces assured the safety of the local régimes which were organized by a small Communist minority. Those "revolutions from outside" were not revolutions even in the sense of the Russian or the Chinese.

The author seems to commit an error when he dismisses the Communist ideology as non-existent and compares Communists to the Mongol conquerors who had only one asset, a superior war technique. The history of most ideologies shows that they survive as a faith despite all contradictions which a non-believer can see between the tenets of the ideology and actual practice of believers. The Communist ideology, whether sincerely shared by the top leaders or not, inspires the rank and file, including sympathizers abroad. The author himself insists rightly on one aspect of Communist ideology, namely the Leninist division of mankind into wealthy and disinherited nations. Actually, the ideological battlefield of the "have-not"

nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is the most perilous for the West. Of course, it is important to understand the Communist technique of infiltration there, but it is even more important to realize that the Communists have not invented the problems of national self-determination or of the low standard of living of the under-developed areas. As long as those problems remain unsolved, the Communists will be able to exploit them for their own purposes and to find new recruits and allies.

A few factual errors could have been avoided; for instance, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance was concluded in 1943, not 1945. The Soviet government sold its rights to the Eastern-Chinese Railroads in 1935 rather than in 1929 (the short paragraph dealing with that involved problem is inexact).

One can also disagree with some interpretations. For instance, the author thinks that Nazi victory in 1933 was mainly pre-determined by the Communist refusal to co-operate with the anti-Nazi parties; one could say, in the light of known facts, that this was one of the causes but not the main one. The principal reasons were the lack of will power among the other anti-Nazi parties, including the Socialists and Catholics, and the lack of support on the part of other German groups, not excluding the Army and business. The attempt at a logical explanation of the Communist defeatist tactics in France in 1939-1940 seems to be far-fetched (the author believes that the Soviet leaders looked at the Nazi armies as on the sword of World Revolution). One can just as well admit that the Communist planners are liable to commit blun-

ders of their own and that they have paid sometimes a price for them (military defeat in Poland in 1920, the Nazi attack in 1941, the Western reaction to the post-war adventurous policy of the Soviet Union in the form of the Truman Doctrine, and NATO, the extensive network of bases, the quick answer to the Communist challenge in Korea, etc.).

Whether or not one agrees with the author's emphasis on the Communist technique as a main factor of their successes, the knowledge of that technique is a *must* in our age. The book is a very valuable contribution to the understanding of Communism and should find its way to the bookshelves not only of specialists but also of average citizens.

W. W. KULSKI

Syracuse University

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY. *Beyond Containment*. Chicago, The Henry Regnery Company, 1953. 397 pp. \$5.00.

In this brisk review of the causes and development of the cold war, Mr. Chamberlin attempts to show that prolonged co-existence with the Moscow-Peking Axis is impossible so long as Leninism-Stalinism dominates its policy, ideology, and institutions.

After charting the failure of appeasement, Mr. Chamberlin summarizes the postwar political, economic and military struggles in Europe and Asia. He sees the Communist threat as threefold: (1) "the threat of a disintegrating idea"; (2) "the threat of a system of organized espionage, sabotage and treason," and (3) "the threat of a vast empire . . . with an insatiable urge

to further expansion." He finds terror and propaganda the twin pillars of Communist power, and emphasizes the rôle of fifth columns in furthering Soviet objectives abroad. He describes America's responses to this threat, and, finally, attempts to weigh the prospects of Stalin's heirs. (Unfortunately, the book was completed before the East German revolt, the fall of Beria, the Korean truce and Malenkov's farm offensive—events which might modify several of Mr. Chamberlin's contentions in detail, if not in substance.)

Mr. Chamberlin views liberation as the logical aim of containment. Rather than create "situations of strength" in order to make a worthless deal with the Kremlin, Mr. Chamberlin says, we should create and use that strength in a consistent effort to eradicate Communist power completely. An appendix reproduces President Eisenhower's Inaugural Address and his and Mr. Dulles's speeches to the American Society of Newspaper Editors—statements which, in essence, reflect Mr. Chamberlin's views.

As might be expected from someone with the author's impressive credentials, *Beyond Containment* is, all in all, a sound, clear review for the layman of the issues of the global struggle. Two objections might be raised by the specialist or policy-maker. The first concerns Mr. Chamberlin's occasional lapses into what has been called "the Asiatic horde approach," according to which the peculiar historical evolution of Russian society is held to be equally responsible with the Bolshevik *Weltanschauung* for the present Communist threat. Here, as elsewhere, this approach rests on a great number of highly question-

able assumptions. (Two random examples: the notion that Orthodox Christian institutions were "less democratic" than those of the Roman Church; the neglect of Russia's tremendous human and material losses in World War I, both before and after the March Revolution, as a critical factor in Lenin's triumph.) This approach can only remind the careful reader of those polemicists of World War II (masterfully refuted by Mr. Chamberlin at the time) who resurrected Tacitus to prove that "civilization stopped at the Rhine," the "Teutons" were always "barbarians," and so forth.

A more basic shortcoming is Mr. Chamberlin's failure to discuss seriously the question of war. It is this reviewer's opinion that anyone considering Western policy today must come to grips with the paradox that both of this century's World Wars for freedom actually resulted in the extinction and erosion of civilized life in large areas of the globe. George Kennan, however he may be criticized on other grounds, has shown a fundamental and subtle awareness of this great irony; Mr. Chamberlin's position would be a great deal stronger if he manifested a similar awareness.

ANATOLE SHUB

New York City

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC. *Russia, What Next?* New York, Oxford University Press, 1953. 230 pp. \$3.00.

As the title implies, this is a book of prophecy. But as many prophets are not heeded in their own time, it is certain that Mr. Deutscher's attempt to foretell the shape of things to come in the Soviet Union will certainly raise many questions in the

minds of serious students of Soviet affairs. Perhaps his early political experiences have unduly shaped the author's thinking, for we find stated on page 17 his belief in G. V. Plekhanov's sweeping generalization that: "Owing to the specific qualities of their minds and characters, influential individuals can change *the individual features of events and some of their particular consequences*, but they can not change their general trend, which is determined by other forces." (Deutscher's italics)

On page 41, Mr. Deutscher makes the unprovable assertion that: "If, for instance, a certain General Bonaparte had been killed in battle before he had time to become First Consul and Emperor . . . another general would have filled his place with essentially the same effect." Using this as a frame of reference, then, the author makes his prophecy. He sees Lenin as having died just at a time when events dictated a change in the policies of the Soviet State. He sees Stalin as the man whom events placed in the position to make these changes which could not be further postponed. Stalin turned Russia in on herself (Lenin was basically an internationalist); Stalin created an autocratic rule through the Party (Lenin had never made a principle of the single-party system) and so on. All of these statements upon which Deutscher based his prophecies are themselves open to question.

Now after the death of Stalin, Mr. Deutscher forecasts the inevitable breakup of Stalinism. He sees the successors of the "Great Leader," "Teacher" and "Friend," as being cast by history in the rôle of the destroyers of Stalinism. Changes must inevitably take place in the domestic and in the interna-

tional politics of the Soviet State. Mr. Deutscher sees a trend toward democracy as the inevitable consequence of Stalin's death: "One can almost hear him [Malenkov] pleading in the inner circle of the Kremlin: 'Better to abolish the worst features of Stalinism from above than to wait until they are abolished from below.'" The exposure of the "Doctor's Plot" as a great miscarriage of justice and the first conciliatory gestures of amnesty are cited as evidences of this trend. In view of what has subsequently happened, it could be asked quite cogently if these moves were not part and parcel of the power struggle between Beria and Malenkov.

The author is also optimistic about the future in respect to Russia's relations with the Western Democracies, provided the United States does not force out the Malenkov "Conciliators" and bring in Soviet Bonapartes by some rash act in the international sphere.

The book is ably and sometimes brilliantly written. It reads easily and it pleads its case convincingly, if one accepts its fundamental assumptions. But there are many among us who will choose to wait and see.

KENNETH I. DAILEY

Syracuse University

TOLSTOY, ALEXANDRA. *Tolstoy: A Life of My Father*. New York, Harper, 1953. 541 pp. \$5.00.

"I am happy," Alexandra Tolstoy writes in her preface, "to have written this book . . . I have tried to describe a man, who, all his life, worked for moral improvement . . . I should like to share with all the readers my love for this extraordi-

nary, kind, sensitive, gay and inspiring man, who yet was great in his simplicity and humility, as a human being—my father—and I would like to bring him nearer to you. If I achieve this even partially, I shall have succeeded."

Indeed, Alexandra Tolstoy has succeeded. Her book is not only a valuable contribution to Tolstoyan studies, it is invaluable in itself, as a first hand testimony of Tolstoy's beloved daughter, his Cordelia, who reflects her father's religious and ethical mind, as well as his humility.

In this volume we find an expert utilization of bulky materials classified and analyzed by the author. To this we must add, of course, Alexandra Tolstoy's own reminiscences, her personal story in her father's house. As a child, she loved him, and he cherished her. As a teenager, she was tutored by him and was his secretary. Finally, she was at her father's side during the tragic years of conflict, both within the family and on the public scene. She witnessed his flight from home in 1910, and his death at the Astapovo station-master's house. This obscure railway junction became for a few days the center of tense emotion, not only in Russia, but in the whole world.

In order to write her book, Alexandra Tolstoy went over an immense collection of documentary material which includes various accounts and testimonies by members of Tolstoy's family, intimates, friends, as well as critical essays and reviews by Tolstoy's contemporaries. But even more important are Tolstoy's diaries—a record of his life almost day by day from early youth to the very end. Alexandra Tolstoy offers an excellent synopsis of these diaries, covering

her father's literary, ethical, and religious experiences.

To the lay reader who cannot devote a great deal of time to Tolstoyan studies, this wisely and lovingly selected source-material is most illuminating, while to the student specializing in Tolstoy, the book is a priceless key. The index alone is a hand-book of scholarship and research.

More important, however, is the fact that this book offers us Tolstoy's human story, from childhood and youth (so masterfully depicted by himself) to adult years. We see young Tolstoy sowing his wild oats, sickening from his own adventures and misadventures, off to the wars in the Caucasus and to besieged Sebastopol, then back to his country house at Yasnaya Polyana. His love for the peasant girl, Axynia, brought him close to the people. We further witness Tolstoy's endeavors to organize rural schools and rural book-printing and distribution in an effort to solve the peasant problem after the emancipation of the serfs, and his continual self-examination as to the *why* and *how* of man in general, and of the Russian country gentleman in particular.

Alexandra Tolstoy recounts further her father's "settling down," his marriage to Sophia Andreevna Behrs, their home life, and their many children. Some of them died almost in the cradle, others survived, including Alexandra. This was, in the beginning, an exceptionally happy marriage, and family life was pleasant. Tolstoy took pride in it. However, he was not concerned with his *kith and kin* alone. He was concerned with *other* people. After a fire which destroyed hundreds of peasants' homes, Tolstoy wrote: "It is pitiful, terrible,

and magnificent." Everything to him was less important than the Russian people and their suffering. Tolstoy's own religious crisis, carefully analyzed in Alexandra Tolstoy's book—his remorse, scruples, search for truth, finally resolved in the message of the Sermon on the Mount—all these are testimonies of a dedicated soul. There was another tragedy, that of Tolstoy's home and family life. In all charity and understanding, Alexandra Tolstoy seeks to solve this dilemma. We feel that she has greatly contributed to the interpretation of the Tolstoy drama. Let us be grateful both to the father and to the daughter who combine in giving us a unique message.

HELENE ISWOLSKY

Fordham University

PARKINS, MAURICE FRANK. *City Planning in Soviet Russia*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953. 257 pp. \$6.00.

Urban planning is one of the most vital areas of a nation's cultural activities. Planning in the U.S.S.R., where state and government are the absolute masters over the vast space and resources of the country, has been for three decades the subject of live interest and great expectations on the part of Western observers.

"The Soviet government has made bold and progressive long-term decisions about the future of her cities and countryside. It is the purpose of this study to examine these decisions and evaluate accomplishments in Soviet city planning" (Preface). To achieve his purpose, the author has gathered nearly all material (chiefly Soviet publications) available in this country. We should be thankful to him both for the clear

presentation of the facts and for their unprejudiced critical appraisal.

In accordance with the Soviet periodization, the author considers three stages of urban development in the U.S.S.R.: the initial stage, 1922-1931; the transitional stage, 1931-1944, and the reconstruction stage, 1944-1950. The main topics of the first two decades are: construction of the workers' settlements; various housing projects and dwelling types; planning and construction of new cities, and the basic city forms; attempts at collaboration with leading architects of the West, and, particularly, the reconstruction of the national capital. Twenty-two pages of the text are devoted to a careful analysis of the Moscow plan of 1935, to its accomplishments and shortcomings, and to the basic principles of city planning derived from that comprehensive plan. The restoration of urban and rural centers destroyed during the last war; the encouragement of private home building, and the current and future trends in urbanization and housing are the chief content of the chapters about the third stage, and of an addendum on the 1950-52 period.

Other sections of the work are devoted to the historical background, the legal aspects, the organizational setup and its tremendous, highly centralized bureaucratic machinery, the training of architects and planners, the building industry, and to an illuminating discussion of "criticism and self-criticism" (the less euphemistic heading "mutual denunciations" seems to me more adequate). Nearly a half of the book (pp. 127-240) consists of an ample interpretative bibliography of Russian and non-Russian sources.

The acute housing shortage and

distressing living conditions in urban centers are the sinister leitmotifs of this study. On p. 58, the author presents several reasons for the prevailing housing distress, such as: "inadequate housing supply before the war; the rapid growth in urban population, and the insufficiency of building materials and of skilled workers." A preoccupation with ideologically important or representative buildings ("in order to produce an immediately favorable impression") is emphasized on p. 45. All this should be supplemented by more fundamental factors: the insignificant investment of the national income in housing construction (8.1 percent during the Third Five-Year Plan), and the continuous armament which consumes the major part of the resources. The disproportionate allotment of dwelling space among the different social groups and the living quarter privileges of the Soviet social élite, should also have been taken into consideration by the author.

Although a study of urban planning naturally emphasizes the economic and technical aspects, the author more than once touches upon the architectural and aesthetic problems. His scattered remarks on symptomatic changes of stylistic trends and on the artistic values of plans and separate buildings are on the whole quite apt and judicious, especially as regards the recent development. The Forum-like elaboration of the city-centers (to this reviewer strikingly reminiscent of the Western fascist tendencies), the persistent predilection for gigantomania, over-façadism and false monumentality, the "crude copying of classical forms," and, since the third stage, the growing stress on national tradition, which leads to

"designing cities as museums, and not as places in which to live," are examples of such, largely negative, estimates.

The author also recognizes the importance of historical perspective for an adequate treatment of the present trends and practices. However, his fairly large bibliography of old Russian cities, monuments, and architects of the past seems to me rather haphazard: while listing several unimportant publications, he does not include the German studies by Ainalov, Alpatov and Brunov, V. Lazarev's *Iskusstvo Novgoroda*, Rzianin's *Arkhitekturnye ansambl'i*, a number of works on the great planners Bazhenov, Rossi, Starov, Stasov, and Thomon, and other Soviet publications pertinent to his theme.

In conclusion, several factual errors concerning Russian architecture should be pointed out. Extremely confusing for a non-professional reader are the contradictory statements in the annotation to Leblond's plan of St.-Petersburg (Fig. I): "oriented to the design of Peter I's palace and not to the River Neva," and in note 20, p. 6: "In Leblond's plan . . . the radii converge on the Admiralty, not on Peter's Palace." The latter statement could apply only to the plans produced later by the Commission on the building of St. Petersburg, and not to Leblond's plan of 1717 which, incidentally (and contrary to the author's assertion in the annotation to Fig. I), had but little influence on the planning of St. Petersburg and other cities in Russia. On p. 73, Pskov is called "the 18th (!) century city, famous for its historical monuments." On p. 176, among the most remarkable monuments of Novgorod, the author lists

"the Mirozhsky Cathedral of the Antoniev Monastery, built by Peter I." Master Peter (not the Emperor) was the builder of the Cathedral (of the Virgin's Nativity) of the Antoniev Monastery (1117) and of the St. George Cathedral of the Yuriev Monastery (1119), both in Novgorod; while "Mirozhsky" is the name of the famous monastery near Pskov; and the Transfiguration Cathedral of this monastery was built about 1156. On p. 194, Rostov Velikii (in the Yaroslavl province, therefore misleadingly called "Rostov-Yaroslavl" on pp. 6 and 9, and in the Index) is obviously confused with Rostov-on-Don. On p. 229, the bell tower of Ivan the Great is referred to as "Cloister of Ivan the Terrible." On p. 230, Troitsko-Sergievskaia Vavra (15-18th cc.) is confused with Kiev-Pecherskaia Lavra (11-12 and 18th cc.) and described as "the 14th-century monument in Kiev, destroyed by the Nazis."

Such factual inaccuracies impair but slightly the value of Mr. Parkins' serious and useful study. They make evident that even for our scholars, Russia's artistic heritage and her historical monuments remain still a *terra incognita*.

NICOLAI S. VOROBIOV

Smith College

PARES, SIR BERNARD. *A History of Russia*. "The definitive edition." New York, A. A. Knopf, 1953. 611 pp. \$7.50.

It is not ordinarily the policy of this journal to give more than a brief notice to new editions of familiar books, but an exception seems in order in this case. After all, for over a quarter of a century

Pares' *History of Russia* has been the standard and the most widely used textbook in our collegiate courses in Russian history. For many of us, it was a major part of our introduction to this fascinating field. The sixth and final edition of this well-known text deserves more than a mention under "New Books Received."

The publisher wisely chose for this final edition to return to the size of the original edition and to an excellent type face which compares favorably with that used in 1926. It is a relief, to put it mildly, to get away from the small type and crowded pages of the editions of the 1940s. The publisher has also supplied an up-dated bibliography and ten new maps, both of which are great improvements over the preceding editions.

The other new addition is a tenderly understanding, straightforwardly honest, biographical sketch of Sir Bernard by his son, Richard Pares. Those who knew

the father will best appreciate the sympathetic, accurate insights of the son, but those to whom Sir Bernard is only a name will better be able to appreciate and to evaluate Sir Bernard's writings if they first read this sketch of his life and work. No better critique has yet appeared, nor is there likely to be one; and it would be unfair, if not presumptuous, to try to paraphrase or give a digest of Mr. Pares' estimate of his father.

As for the book itself, the first twenty-four chapters, except for minor shifts, were first printed in 1926. The 1944 edition carried the story to 1941; the 1947 edition added the chapter on the war and an epilogue. All this appears in this new edition which has, therefore, both the strengths and the weaknesses, the earlier insights and the later confusion of mind (as his son calls it), of its predecessors.

WARREN B. WALSH
Syracuse University

BOOK NOTICES

BERMAN, HAROLD J. *The Russians in Focus*. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1953. 209 pp. \$3.00.

The purpose of this book is to provide "a short concise statement of some of the basic characteristics of everyday Soviet life. . . ." It is intended for the general reader and contains informative chapters on such subjects as the Soviet soldier, peasant, worker, the Soviet family, education, medical care, the press, religion and the Party. The author's aim is "to bring out the good and the bad" features of the Soviet system, i.e., the tyrannical and repressive aspects, but also to "stress the successes and satisfactions of the system for the Russian people." The general idea that seems to come out of this book is that the Russian people accept oppression because of satisfactions they derive in such areas as education, medical care, the "sense of belonging" in the industrial life of the country, and "social discipline."

GRULIOW, LEO (Ed.). *Current Soviet Policies*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. 268 pp. \$6.00.

This book is "the documentary record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and of the reorganization after Stalin's death." It is made up of translations of articles as they appeared in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. Mr. Grulow is responsible for the selection of the speeches, resolutions, articles, and all the illustrative material. He has contributed a very helpful and very cautious introduction in which he deals with the various interpretations of the

mysterious events before and after Stalin's death.

It is a pity that the publication deadline did not permit the inclusion of materials on the downfall of Lavrenti Beria, Khrushchev's critique of Soviet agriculture, and Mikoyan's praise of capitalistic sales techniques. A future edition which will bring the story up to date would be welcome. Even so, the title of the book remains valid because, regardless of organizational and tactical changes, the basic policies of the Soviet régime, as laid down by Stalin and proclaimed at the Nineteenth Party Congress, will, in all probability, continue to haunt the world for years to come.

MONNEROT, JULES. *Sociology and Psychology of Communism*. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1953. 339 pp. \$6.00.

The author concerns himself in this volume with Communist ideology (and what he regards as its implications): Party structure, Soviet internal politics, the genesis of the Bolshevik Party, and Russian foreign policy. He also deals extensively with more general topics such as the historical significance of absolutism, the psychology of what he calls "secular religion," and the nature and function of revolution.

SOVIET SCIENCE. Washington, D.C., American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1952. 108 pp. \$1.25.

This symposium of articles on the status of Soviet science and the effects on science of political dictation

in Communist countries is an excellent survey of the subject. It is based on papers presented at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Philadelphia, December 27, 1951. The authors of the several articles include some scientists who were born and trained in Russia and some who have followed closely particular areas of Soviet scientific activity. The contents are as follow: "Russian Genetics" (Theodosius Dobzhansky), "Russian Physiology and Pathology" (Horsley Gantt), "Russian Psychology and Psychiatry" (Ivan D. London), "Scientific Method and Social Science: East and West" (Russell L. Ackoff), "Russian Contribution to Soil Science" (J. S. Joffe), "Soviet Physics and Chemistry" (John Turkevich), "Soviet Mathematics" (J. R. Kline), "Science and Intellectual Freedom in Russia" (Lazar Volin), "An Appraisal of Science in the USSR" (Conway Zirkle).

The American Association for the Advancement of Science is to be congratulated on bringing out this

very valuable book which has both intrinsic current and historical value.

SLUSSER, ROBERT (Ed.). *Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany*. New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953. 184 pp. \$2.25.

This short paper-bound study will be valuable to those interested in the problem of Soviet occupation of Eastern Germany. It is divided into four chapters entitled: "The First Phase of Soviet Occupation," "The Administrative Organization of Soviet Control," "Soviet Agricultural Policy in Eastern Germany," and "The Saxony Uranium Mining Operation." Seven former Soviet officials furnished the materials made available here in English for the first time. There is a chronology of events from May 7, 1945 to June 20, 1950, a bibliography of books, pamphlets, and articles dealing with Eastern Germany, and a map of the area.

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DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Editor

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The following outstanding books are now available at Russian bookstores or through Russian book dealers:

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The author assesses the historical road which Russia has traveled between the epoch of the "Great Reforms" and the Revolution of 1917. His analysis of the present conflict between democracy and totalitarianism offers particular interest.

Vladimir Solovyov—THREE CONVERSATIONS
240 pp. \$2.25

The works of Vladimir Solovyov exercised considerable influence on Russian religious philosophy at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In **THREE CONVERSATIONS**, Solovyov attempted to analyze the problem of fighting evil and the meaning of history from three points of view: the practical everyday point of view, the point of view of culture and progress, and the religious point of view.

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